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Lithuania’s security rests at present on several pillars, including membership in 
NATO and the European Union and its relations with Russia. Without doubt Lithuania’s 
membership in NATO and the European Union is the most promising way to preserve its 
independence and to promote its security. At the same time, however, Lithuania wishes to 
maintain constructive relations with Russia and to address Moscow’s legitimate political, 
military, and economic concerns. In view of the importance of domestic political factors, 
this thesis examines the hypothesis that Lithuania should base its security on a mix of 
deterrence strategies and reassurance policies pursued in cooperation with fellow 
members of NATO and the European Union. The thesis therefore analyzes post-Cold 
War trends in Lithuanian-Russian relations in light of theories of deterrence and 
reassurance. Three cases—NATO enlargement from 1997 to 2004, the Russian military 
troop withdrawal from Lithuania in 1991-1993, and Lithuanian-Russian relations 
concerning Kaliningrad—are discussed to assess the effects of reassurance and 
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Among the dramatic changes that took place in Eastern Europe in 1989-1990, one 
unprecedented event is worth particular attention – on 11 March 1990, Lithuania became 
the first union republic to declare its independence from the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. Moscow’s reaction was negative, despite Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s announcement two months earlier about a possible secession. The Kremlin 
had tolerated, even encouraged, changes that occurred in the Warsaw Pact countries, but 
objected when these changes affected Soviet territory directly. Gorbachev attempted to 
isolate Lithuania and to intimidate other republics by using diplomatic and economic 
pressure. This conflict culminated in military action conducted by the Soviet army in 
Vilnius on 13 January 1991, during which 13 civilians were killed and many injured.  
These events have raised an old and still unresolved security problem for 
Lithuania – “Being pro-Western, but not anti-Eastern.” In other words, being a part of 
Western civilization, but at the same time being seen by Moscow as not anti-Russian. 
This posture entailed remaining an independent state, while not undermining its own 
security. Two factors have been major determinants of Lithuania’s security from the 
beginning of the country’s history. First, Lithuania geographically lies between Western 
civilization, defined by Latin Christianity, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment, and 
an Eastern civilization shaped by Orthodox Christianity and Russian dominance. As a 
result, through six centuries, Lithuania has endured and been devastated by the clash of 
interests between Germans, Swedes and Russians. Second, Lithuania is in Russia’s 
immediate proximity. Any major political changes in Russia or in its military power 
influenced Lithuania directly. From the very beginning Lithuania gravitated toward the 
West, but this approach created problems with Russia, which saw Western civilization as 
unfriendly and even antagonistic. Lithuania’s long history of negative experiences with 
Russia proves how difficult it is to resolve the problem of being independent and secure. 
Lithuanian independence was challenged repeatedly. In the16th century Tsar Ivan IV 
launched the Livonian War (1557-82), hoping to gain access to the Baltic Sea; and 
Lithuania had to become a part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In the 18th 
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century the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth came to an end, and Lithuania became a 
part of the Russia Empire. In the 20th century, after the redistribution of areas of influence 
between Germany and the Soviet Union on 15 June 1940, Lithuania was annexed by the 
Soviet Union.  
Lithuania’s experience confirms that whenever Russia raised a strong military, it 
posed a real threat to Lithuanian independence. As the nation was unable to resist 
coercion effectively, Lithuania suffered huge cultural and human losses. To prevent such 
losses in the future, Lithuania, after it proclaimed independence, sought membership in 
the European Union (EU) and NATO. In April-May 2004 Lithuania joined NATO and 
the EU. Without doubt, gaining membership in NATO and the EU is a positive step and 
the most promising way to gain confidence in efforts to preserve Lithuanian 
independence. But can membership in NATO ensure Lithuanian security in the future in 
view of this nation’s old dilemma–that is, how can Lithuania be independent and secure?  
A. THE MAIN CHALLENGE 
There are two sides to the problem: the effects of Lithuanian membership in 
NATO on Russia and the effects of internal politics in Russia on Lithuania. Lithuania’s 
main interest in NATO is to ensure its security in the long run. However, as most realist 
theorists argue, increasing one’s security through the acquisition of allies simultaneously 
poses a threat to others. Regardless of the accuracy of this theory, it seems that many 
Russians view the membership of the Baltic States in NATO as threatening.  
Political processes within Russia may influence Lithuania’s security in two ways. 
Promoting democracy in Russia and making positive changes in its economy may create 
a favorable atmosphere for peace in the Baltic region, but anti-democratic trends in 
Russia may destabilize the situation in the region and consequently threaten Lithuanian 
security. Therefore internal politics in Russia promise to be important determinants of 
Lithuania’s security. Russia’s concerns and interests in the Baltic region directly 
influence Lithuania’s bilateral relations with Moscow and its national security. 
Therefore, under these circumstances, Lithuania must define and pursue prudent 
policies to preserve its security and integrity. What policies should Lithuania employ to 
preserve its independence and at the same time promote its security?  This question has 
been the major challenge for the nation’s political and military leaders because answering 
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it may help to solve the Lithuanian security problem. This is the main subject in an 
ongoing discussion between hard-liners who advocate deterrence and soft-liners who 
promote reassurance. Lithuanian politicians have employed both kinds of policy–
cooperative (or reassurance) policies and non-cooperative (or deterrence) policies.  
At the beginning of independence in the early 1990s, the non-cooperative policies 
were pursued, and as a consequence, an atmosphere of hostility and animosity between 
Vilnius and Moscow prevailed. With a change in political leadership in Lithuania, the 
government adopted more cooperative policies, and this affected Lithuanian-Russian 
relations positively. Soft-liners support this policy and insist on continuing it as a way to 
insure Lithuanian security. But they overlook the long history of relations between these 
two countries and fail to note that Russia may have other than benign purposes in dealing 
with Lithuania. Hard-liners argue that only deterrence can create a favorable situation for 
improving the country’s security. NATO’s decision to expand further to the east 
promoted more fruitful Lithuanian-Russian discussions. Hard-liners interpret this as 
evidence that only deterrence works in relations with Russia.  
Also, a wide range of research on the utility of different courses of action 
supporting deterrence, reassurance or neutrality policies has been conducted. The most 
widely accepted argument holds that only deterrence policies can help Lithuania solve its 
security problem. According to Mark Kramer, this policy improved regional stability in 
Europe and resulted in improving Lithuania’s relations with Russia.1 Antanas Stakishaitis 
has even asserted that Russia will appreciate Lithuania joining NATO because it will help 
Russia to rethink and accept a new world order, concentrating more attention on its 
internal problems, and eventually evolve to a more democratic state.2 Charles Perry, 
Michael Sweeney, and Andrew Winner have noted that the EU is not likely to provide the 
Baltic States with sufficient guarantees against Russia, and that only NATO can be a 
guarantor against a possible resurgence in Russia’s imperialistic ambitions.3  
                                                 
1 Mark Kramer, “NATO, The Baltic States and Russia: A Framework for Sustainable Enlargement,” 
International Affairs, vol.78, no. 4 (October 2002), 755.  
2 Antanas Stakishaitis, “Rusija ir Lietuivos Saugumas,” (Russia and Lithuanian Security), in Egidijus 
Vareikis, Skaitymai apie Nacionalini ir Tarptautini Sauguma (Readings about National and International 
Security) (Vilnius: Atlantas, 2001), 86. This book is in Lithuanian, and all translations from this book are 
by the author of this thesis.  
3 Charles M. Perry, Michael J. Sweeney, and Andrew C. Winner, Strategic Dynamics in the Nordic-
Baltic Region: Implications for U.S. Policy (Dulles: Brassey’s Inc., 2000), 183.  
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However, others hold that Lithuania joining NATO will have a negative impact 
and that it would be wiser to pursue more cooperative policies. Paul Gallis has reported 
that some opponents of enlargement think that it may only create “a Weimar Russia” and 
that it would be more prudent to leave European stability to institutions such as the EU 
and the OSCE (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe).4 Grazina 
Meniotaite supports the same position and holds that joining NATO may only enlarge 
Lithuania’s old historical problem of “pro-West but not anti-East,” and that constructive 
cooperation with Russia is vital for Lithuania’s security.5  
The approach scholars least support is neutrality. This is because neutrality in the 
current situation is less promising. As Beata Simanska has stated, in a world of total 
interdependence, in a world where regional conflicts spread easily from one state to 
another, in a world of new threats such as international terrorism, crime, failing states, 
depleted resources, and diseases, Lithuania’s neutrality is impossible.6 Therefore, it is not 
surprising that Lithuanian politicians did not even mention neutrality as a possible course 
in their discussions.           
These contradicting views raise the following question: After Lithuania becomes 
a member of NATO, which policies might it pursue to solve the old security problem: 
how can it be pro-Western, but not anti-Russian? The main hypothesis investigated in this 
thesis is that NATO can address, to some degree, Lithuania’s security concerns, but that 
more cooperative policies should be employed to meet some of the challenges that 
Lithuania faces in its relations with Russia. Three questions may help answer the main 
one. First, what are Lithuania’s and Russia’s main concerns? Also, under what conditions 
can deterrence policies succeed, and what are their limitations? Lastly, under what 
conditions can reassurance policies succeed?  
B. DETERRENCE AND REASSURANCE IN THEORY 
Before beginning an analysis, there is a need to define some terms and basic 
assumptions that will be used to assess specific cases. First, according to Paul Huth, a 
                                                 
4 Paul E. Gallis, NATO Enlargement: Pro and Con Arguments, (Washington, D.C., CRS Report for 
Congress, 1997), available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/popro.htm  (15 April 2003). 
5 Grazina Meniotaite, Lietuvos Saugumo Politika ir Integracijos Dilema (The Security Policy of 
Lithuania and the Integration Dilemma) (Vilnius: Rastas, 1999), 14.  
6 Beata Simanska, “Neutralitetas Siolaikiniam Pasaulije,” (Neutrality in Current World), in Egidijus 
Vareikis, Readings about National and International Security (Vilnius: Atlantas, 2001), 46. 
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deterrence strategy attempts to prevent an undesired action by convincing the party who 
may be contemplating such an action that the cost will exceed any possible gain. Huth 
presents four types of deterrence:  
• Direct: to prevent an armed attack against a country’s own territory; 
• Extended: to prevent an armed attack against another country; 
• Immediate: when threat is used in response to a pressing short term 
threat of attack; 
• General: to prevent short-term crises and militarized conflicts from 
arising. 7 
   
In terms of Huth’s definitions, Lithuania’s membership in NATO can be regarded 
as promoting extended and general deterrence. In contrast, reassurance strategies are 
conceived as “a set of strategies that adversaries can use to reduce the likelihood of 
resorting to the threat or the use of force.”8 In this thesis strategies of deterrence and 
reassurance are independent variables; Lithuania’s security is a dependent variable, and 
the main intervening variables or factors that affect the outcome are the credibility of 
NATO and Lithuania and Russia’s motivations.  
According to deterrence theory, the success of a deterrence strategy is determined 
by a set of variables: the deterrer’s credibility and capabilities; strategic, domestic, and 
psychological factors; and time. One of the most important variables is credibility. 
Richard Ned Lebow emphasizes the importance of credibility and points out four major 
conditions for deterrence success:  
• Commitments should be clearly defined; 
• Commitments should be communicated to the adversary; 
• Commitments should be enforceable (having the capabilities to honor 
the commitments); 
• The deterrer should have a strong resolve to carry out his threats 
(owing to a reputation based on his past behavior and apparent 
intentions).9   
  
                                                 
7 Paul K. Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” 
Annual Review of Political Science, vol.2 (1999), 26.  
8 Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Reassurance,” in Philip E. Tetlock et al., Behavior, Society, and 
Nuclear War, vol. II (Oxford, 1991), 31. 
9 Richard N. Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore and 
London: John Hopkins University Press, 1981), 84-90.  
6 
According to these assumptions, the more specific the commitment is, the more 
likely it will be believed; but a commitment unknown to an adversary has no deterrence 
value. Moreover, the failure to develop the military capability to honor a commitment 
encourages an adversary to question the defender’s resolve. Finally, a poor bargaining 
reputation encourages challenges.  
As any theory or policy has its limitations, deterrence is not an exception. 
Deterrence can fail because of technical problems, political restraints or a domestic 
policy. It can also fail if there is a lack of commitment or a misperception. First, 
deterrence may fail because of technical problems or political constraints. According to 
Paul Huth, in the case of extended immediate deterrence, the mobilization and 
transportation of substantial allied forces beyond their borders could take a long time, but 
the situation in extended immediate deterrence requires a rapid movement of forces into 
position to repulse an attack. Moreover, successful deployment could be undercut by 
domestic and political constraints that prevent leaders from implementing more effective 
policies.10 Second, deterrence could fail because the actors are not committed. In this 
case it is conceivable that countries may have some domestic considerations (their own 
security, economic or political interests) that prevent them from expressing a strong 
commitment to defend an ally. Finally, “individual psychological biases” or “failures of 
overall national evaluative capabilities” may result in misperceptions that could lead to 
deterrence failures.11 
The use of reassurance may help to mitigate hostility and mistrust, reducing fears 
and the possibility of misperceptions. Consequently, it could also reduce or eliminate the 
negative effects of strategic and psychological factors. To succeed, reassurance strategies 
must overcome psychological, political and strategic obstacles. However, the main 
determinant of success is an adversary’s motivation. According to Charles Glaser, states, 
according to their motives for expansion, can be divided into two categories: security-
driven (or not-greedy) and non-security-driven (or greedy). Greedy states are willing to 
incur costs or risks for “non security expansion,” while a non-greedy state is unwilling to 
                                                 
10 Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict,” 36. 
11 Charles L. Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral 
and Deterrence Models,” World Politics, vol. 44, no. 4 (July 1992), 514. 
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run such risks. Potentially insecure states are inclined to be insecure in the face of 
military capabilities that they believe threaten their ability to defend themselves. By 
contrast, “always-secure” states recognize that the defender is interested in its security 
and would use force only in response to aggression.12  
In view of the past history of Lithuania-Russia relations, we can formulate the 
hypothesis that Lithuania is “not-greedy” but potentially insecure and that Russia is 
“greedy” and potentially insecure.  Joining the theories advanced by Janice Gross Stein 
and Charles Glaser, it may be hypothesized that, if an adversary is driven largely by 
domestic political needs or strategic weaknesses and is concerned largely about its own 
security (non-greedy but insecure), then a reassurance policy may be more appropriate 
than a strategy of deterrence.  
If an adversary’s motives are only driven by gains (greedy and always secure), 
then a reassurance strategy may fail. In a situation of mixed motives (not-greedy but 
potentially insecure), reassurance may be more effective as a complement to deterrence.13 
Other factors, such as strategic, domestic, psychological, and time factors are not 
considered here because of the limited scope of this thesis.  
C. METHODOLOGY                  
To answer the main question, the relations between Lithuania and Russia from 
1990 to 2003 are analyzed. The main concerns of Lithuania and Russia are considered as 
well as how deterrence and reassurance can address Lithuania’s concerns while taking 
Russia’s concerns into account. Deterrence and reassurance theories are employed in this 
thesis to assess the Lithuanian case. To test the argument that NATO can address to some 
degree Lithuania’s security concerns, but that to meet some of the challenges that 
Lithuania faces in its relations with Russia more cooperative policies should be 
employed, three cases are studied: Russia’s troop withdrawal from Lithuania, the 
Kaliningrad issue, and Lithuania’s membership in NATO.  
The main factors to assess the outcomes of deterrence and reassurance policies 
used in this thesis are Russia’s motivations and NATO’s and Lithuania’s commitment to 
maintain the country’s independence. 
                                                 
12 Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and 
Deterrence Models,” 501-502. 
13 Stein, Deterrence and Reassurance, 58-59. 
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 The main sources for this thesis are official documents, journal articles, and 
books about security in the Baltic region. Information from the media and opinion polls 
are also used as supplemental material.  
Chapter II reviews the relations between Lithuania and Russia and analyses 
Lithuania’s main security concerns and Russia’s concerns.  
Chapter III considers whether and under what conditions deterrence in the form of 
NATO membership can address Lithuania’s main security concerns. This chapter also 
discusses the limits of this approach.  
Chapter IV examines NATO and Lithuanian reassurance policies to mitigate 
Russia’s concerns. Three cases are examined in this chapter. This chapter also evaluates 
whether and to what extent these policies were successful.  
Chapter V draws the main conclusions from the analysis. It presents some 
recommendations in order to create a more secure environment in the Baltic region and to 
insure Lithuanian security. This chapter also emphasizes the need for further studies in 


















II. LITHUANIAN–RUSSIAN RELATIONS 
A.  THE HISTORY OF THE “BEING PRO-WEST BUT NOT ANTI-EAST” 
PUZZLE 
As a nation, Lithuania emerged about 1230 under the leadership of Duke 
Mindaugas. He united Lithuanian tribes against attacks by the Teutonic Knights, and at 
the end of the 14th century Lithuania was already a vast empire, extending from the Baltic 
Sea to the Black Sea. However, under pressure from the Teutonic Knights, Lithuania 
could no longer stand alone; and to preserve its way of life, it looked to Poland for 
support. Polish support was ensured by a dynastic marriage in exchange for Lithuania’s 
conversion to Catholicism in 1386. This turning point in Lithuanian history was crucial in 
determining Lithuania’s development as an independent entity. However, its drive for 
independence and its inclination toward a Western way of life were challenged each time 
whenever Russia gained military power. Lithuania’s security and its status shifted with 
Russia’s military power.  
The first change in Lithuania’s status occurred with Russia’s military and 
economic growth during the rule of Peter the Great. Russia attempted to expand to the 
Baltic coast, when Peter the Great launched the great Northern War (1700-21). After 
Sweden’s defeat and the transfer of Latvia and Estonia to Russia under the treaty of 
Nystad (1721), Russia, along with Prussia and Austria, launched a campaign to weaken 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth internally.14 
In 1795, after several partitions Poland’s independent existence ended and 
Lithuania became a part of the Russia Empire. The Tsar, Nicholas I, implemented 
programs designed to integrate the Baltic States into the Russian Empire; these 
“Russification” policies were seen by Lithuanians as a cultural and political 
suppression.15 Russian social and political institutions were introduced. Lithuanian-
language schools were forbidden, Lithuanian publications in the Latin script were 
outlawed, and the Roman Catholic Church was severely suppressed. The result of the 
                                                 
14 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, third edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979), 249. 
15 George von Rauch, The Baltic States: The Years of Independence (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1974), 8. 
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Tsar’s policies was resentment and nationalism, which grew into open unrest, disorder, 
and anti-Russian sentiment. This situation culminated in revolts against Russia’s rule in 
1830s. However, this and other uprisings were unsuccessful, and Lithuania remained 
under Russia’s rule until 1918. 
World War I led to the collapse of the Russian empire, making it possible for 
Lithuania to assert its statehood. On 16 February 1918, Lithuania declared its full 
independence. Independent Lithuania took a course of democratization and liberalization. 
In the 1920s, it was a democratic republic with a strong legislature, a weak executive, a 
multiparty system, and a proportional system of representation. A progressive land 
reform was introduced, a cooperative movement was organized, and a strong currency 
and fiscal management were established.  Moscow, understanding its weaknesses at that 
time, abandoned its efforts to recover the Baltic States and signed the treaty in 1920 by 
which it renounced all claims to Lithuania’s territory in perpetuity.16 Agreements of non-
aggression or neutrality between Russia and Lithuania were signed in 1926 and renewed 
in 1931.  
However, Lithuania’s independence did not last long. After the redistribution of 
areas of influence between Germany and the Soviet Union on 15 June 1940, Lithuania 
was annexed by the Soviet Union. The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact let the Soviet 
Union expand its influence in the Baltic region. Within two months, Moscow forced 
Lithuania into signing a mutual assistance pact, authorizing the Soviet army to station 
20,000 troops on its territory. Lithuania was incorporated into the Soviet Union as the 
result of well-controlled local elections.17 At first a pro-communist government was 
installed, and elections to a new parliament were organized. The elections were 
noncompetitive: a single approved list of candidates was presented to the voters. The 
parliament met on 21 July and declared Soviet rule, and thus Lithuania “joined” the 
Soviet Union on 6 August 1940.  
During the initial phase of annexation, Soviet forces deported 14,000 and 
executed 2,000 political leaders, military officers and national elites. The Soviets 
                                                 
16 V. Stanley Vardys and Romuald J. Misiunas, “Introduction: The Baltic Peoples in Historical 
Perspective,” in V. Stanley Vardys and Romuald J. Misiunas, eds., The Baltic States in Peace and War 
1917—1945 (University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), 10. 
17 John Fitzmaurice, The Baltic: A Regional Future (New York: St. Marin’s Press, 1992), 91. 
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deported another 60,000 Balts in a second wave of arrests in 1940.18 Groups of partisans, 
known as the “Forest Brothers,” resisted the Red Army’s return in 1944 by fighting until 
late 1953. However, this resistance was broken by the Russian-dominated Soviet Union, 
resulting in a forced collectivization of agriculture, rapid industrialization and 
Russification. Between 1944 and 1949 about 550,000 Lithuanians were deported to 
eastern Siberia and central Asia.19 Rapid industrialization created a need for industrial 
workers that fueled a huge wave of immigrants, reaching 160,000 by the mid-1950s.20 
The Soviet Union reduced the proportion of ethnic natives in the population of the Baltic 
States by deportations and Russian immigration, but it was not successful in 
Russification.      
Only at the end of the 20th century, after the Soviet Union’s decline in power, did 
Lithuania again enjoy the possibility of independence. Reforms started by Soviet General 
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 facilitated popular movements that ultimately 
became political movements for independence. The Lithuanian Popular Front (Sajudis) 
calls for independence in 1988 were supported by high officials, including Yeltsin; and 
they led to Lithuania’s declaration of political and economical independence from the 
Soviet Union on 11 March 1990. The Soviet Union’s economic sanctions and attempts to 
dissuade Lithuania from seeking independence by using military force in Vilnius in 
January 1991 failed, as the result of the full support for independence expressed by the 
public, even among ethnic Russian voters, in the referendum held in March 1991.  
This short overview illustrates Lithuania’s historical problem of being pro-West, 
but not anti-East. However, the current trends in Lithuanian – Russian relations can be 
seen as a continuation of this old problem.  
B. POST-COLD WAR TRENDS 
After proclaiming independence in 1991, Lithuania took a course toward 
integration into the EU and NATO. Without doubt Lithuania’s membership in NATO and 
the EU is the most promising way to preserve Lithuanian independence; however, it 
creates some problems in its relations with Russia. Moscow has expressed strong 
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concerns about Lithuania’s integration into the Western organizations, especially NATO, 
an organization that Russia still sees as a threat to its security. Russia’s negative reaction 
highlights the continuation of a historic problem for Lithuania – “Being Pro-West, but not 
Anti-East.” It is useful to analyze the concerns of Lithuania and Russia and the driving 
forces behind their policies toward one another, which aggravate the problems.      
1. Lithuania’s Concerns 
Russia remains the main source of instability in the region and may pose a direct 
threat to Lithuania because there is uncertainty about the future political and economic 
developments in Russia. Moreover, Russia has the military ability and motivation for 
possible aggression.  
a. Uncertainties about Russia’s Future    
To begin with, Russia is not a democratic state yet, and there are 
uncertainties about its future political and economic situation. Although there are signs of 
democratization in Russia’s political system, they are not strong. The party system in 
Russia is still in its infancy and could be most accurately described as an oligarchy. 
According to Perry, Sweeney and Winner, the true basis of the political system is 
“individuals with strong ties to the former communist bureaucracy and/or to powerful 
business interests (legal or otherwise).”  Though a radical “Zhirinovsky-type fascist 
coming to power” is not probable, the presence of other political leaders with communist 
and nationalist leanings such as Luzhkov (the mayor of Moscow) or Zyuganov (the 
Communist party leader) could indicate the possibility of a more aggressive Russian 
foreign policy.21 There is a possibility that strong pro-communist and nationalistic 
movements could negatively influence domestic developments in Russia. These 
developments could be especially disturbing if extreme nationalists and pro-communists 
gain a controlling influence over decision makers.   
Another indicator of the weakness of democratic development in Russia is 
its foreign policy. Aside from the positive developments, there are signs that an 
aggressive imperialistic policy is reemerging in Russia. In the beginning, Russia’s policy 
toward the Baltic States was positive. However, these positive signs lasted only until 
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1995, when Russia changed its policy. In 1995-1996, Russia’s political leaders started to 
employ aggressive rhetoric toward the Baltic States and some provocative security 
studies were conducted in Russia.  
According to Jim Hoagland, Russian President Boris Yeltsin in his secret 
letter to US President Bill Clinton on 25 June 1996, just before the US president’s 
meeting with the presidents of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, expressed the idea that 
“Moscow hopes to squeeze the three small states into acknowledging Russian hegemony 
in economic, military, and political matters.”22  
Moreover, according to Yaroslav Bilinsky, in the middle 1990s, two 
important but unofficial Russian security studies were conducted regarding the Baltic 
States. The first, entitled “Alternative National Security Doctrine” and published in the 
fall of 1995, was secretly sponsored by Pavel Grachev, then Russian Defense Minister. 
The second one, published in 1996 and entitled “Will the Soviet Union Be Reborn? The 
Future of the Post-Soviet Space,” was sponsored by the well-known Council on Foreign 
and Defense Policy in Moscow headed by Sergey Karaganov, a former Gorbachev and 
Yeltsin advisor. The first document proposed “stationing nuclear weapons in Belarus, 
putting troops in the Baltics if they try to join NATO and bombing oilfields in 
Azerbaijan.”23 The second one was more straightforward and stated Russia’s vitally 
important interests that must be protected by using all means, including force: 
• Preventing the dominance, especially military-political, of other powers on 
the territory of the former USSR; 
• Preventing the formation of coalitions hostile to Russia, including those in 
response to Russian actions in the former USSR.24 
 
This message can be understood as a call, under certain conditions, for 
military actions against the Baltic States.  
Although Russia’s present foreign policy toward the Baltic States could be 
seen as more benign, there are some negative trends. In June 2000 President Vladimir 
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Putin signed Russia’s new foreign policy concept. It claims that “an indispensable 
condition here [for the Baltic States having good relations with Russia] is respect by 
those states of Russian interests.”25 But what if these interests are different? Another case 
is the dispute over the Soviet past. In June 2000, the Russian Duma declared that the 
Baltic republics had “voluntarily” joined the Soviet Union and “invited” Soviet troops to 
occupy their territory in the 1940s, while the Baltic States oppose such an interpretation 
of the past.26 All these facts suggest a reemergence of an aggressive imperialistic policy 
in Russia by pressing smaller Baltic States, dictating rules to them, and using various 
instruments to restore an effective hegemony over this part of the former Soviet Union.  
Also, Russia has revealed some imperialistic thoughts about economic 
expansion in the Baltic States’ transport, communication, and machinery industries. 
Moscow has been especially interested in the energy sector, because Russia does not 
want be dependent on the Baltic States. For example, in 1998 the Russian oil giant Lukoil 
attempted to purchase a 30 percent stake in Ventspils Nafta.27 Then, in September 2002, 
the Russian oil company “Juka” successfully acquired a controlling stake in the 
Lithuanian Oil Company “Mazeikiu Nafta.”28  On occasion, tensions have risen between 
Russia and Lithuania because of Moscow’s periodic use of economic pressure (threats to 
withhold oil and gas supplies). 
Serious structural problems confronting Russia’s economy also present 
uncertainties about Russia’s future. The government will not be able to solve all of 
Russia’s economic difficulties in the near future. As William Odom has observed,  
Certain institutions of government are imperative for effective economic 
performance. Efficient allocation of property rights, a reliable third-party 
enforcer of market rules and contracts, and behavioural norms that lower 
transaction costs are among the most important. Russia neither has them 
nor shows any likelihood of creating them soon.29  
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Moreover, to ensure positive movement toward a market-driven economy, 
the government needs to make unpopular decisions that may also destabilize the situation 
in Russia. An analysis of the current economic situation suggests that enduring Russian 
economic prosperity is highly improbable in the next decade or two, owing to the 
country’s dependence on oil and natural gas sales; and this in turn makes Russia’s future 
unpredictable.  
According to Odom, Russian imperialism may not be a major problem 
today, but history shows us that “liberalism in Russia prospers only after major defeats, 
and once the regime has regained its self-confidence and achieved détente with the West, 
Russia returns to domestic repression and imperialism.”30 This was true with Alexander 
I’s and Alexander II’s reforms after defeat in wars—Austerlitz in 1805 and the Crimean 
War in 1856. The next “reforming impulse” in Russia came with its defeat in the war 
with Japan and a revolution at home in 1905. Another impulse for liberal reforms came 
after state power disintegration in 1917. The last impulse came after Russia’s exhaustion 
in the Afghanistan war and the arms race with the United States. The current situation is 
different in only one way. In Odom’s words, “most of the empire… is gone. The imperial 
impulse, however, is not gone. It lacks only effective military power to reconquer its lost 
territories.” 31  
In view of uncertainties in Russia’s political and economic spheres, 
Lithuanian politicians and military planners believe that Lithuania’s security could be 
challenged by the instability within the former Soviet Union (FSU) and by the 
authoritarianism and nationalism expressed within certain political parties and 
movements in Russia. Such uncertainties about Russia’s future raise the question of 
whether Russia has sufficient military power to pose a threat.  
b. Military Threat 
The most serious threat is a possible attack by Russia against Lithuania or 
all the Baltic States. Though this threat is not necessarily imminent, the severity of its 
consequences makes it a serious consideration in any assessment of Lithuanian security. 
The Russian-speaking minority and the Kaliningrad issues could be a basis for 
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aggression; and Russia has the military ability to intervene, especially after the de facto 
military reintegration of Belarus with Russia, and the fortification of garrisons in the 
Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, including the deployment of 18 nuclear-armed SS21 
missiles.32 
As suggested above, two questions, if mismanaged, could lead to 
destabilization in the Baltic region or under certain conditions could be the basis for 
Russian intervention: the Russian-speaking minority and/or instability in Kaliningrad.  
                    (1) The Russian-Speaking Minority. Following World War II, 
the Baltic States were subjected to the same forced industrialization program inflicted on 
all Soviet republics. According to Perry, Sweeney and Winner,   A shortage of workers in 
the heavy-industry sector necessitated a large-scale importation of labor into the Baltic 
States…. Most of the imported labor was Russian, although many Ukrainians, Jews, and 
Belarusians immigrated as well. The Baltics’ comparatively mild climate and higher 
living standards (even under Soviet rule) also made the region a destination for many 
Soviet military retirees.33 
The Russian-speaking minority in Lithuania constitutes 11 percent of 
the total population.34 There is no present threat of this minority becoming a problem 
within Lithuania, but in the long run exploiting this issue from outside is possible, 
particularly from Russia. Although the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic 
States in 1994 helped to release tensions with Moscow over the minority question, the 
issue has never completely faded. In part, this is because of the strong rhetoric adopted in 
many cases by parties from across the Russian political spectrum. After nationalist and 
communist forces initiated such attacks, democratic forces also adopted a hard-line 
position on the status of ethnic Russians in the Baltic States.35 The Russian political 
parties’ attacks on the Baltic States made it difficult for Russian leaders to engage in 
dialogue with their Baltic counterparts. This was evident in the reluctance of President 
Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Victor Chernomirdin to visit the Baltic States in 1996. 
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Visits by high-ranking Russian state and government leaders to the Baltic States still 
occur less frequently than to other former Soviet republics.36  
Moreover, we should not dismiss the fact that the security services 
are still powerful and have immense influence domestically, which was shown during the 
hostage operation in Moscow in October 2002 when 129 people died.37 These services 
could artificially create a situation of unrest among Russian-speaking minorities, 
providing the Russian government a pretext to use military force for direct aggression. 
Therefore NATO politicians and military planners should take into account the fact that 
these options could be exploited to commit acts of aggression.  
(2)    Kaliningrad. Another danger is that negative political 
developments in Russia could increase tensions over the Kaliningrad district and could 
increase Moscow’s desire to exploit the Kaliningrad issue as a pressure point in Russia’s 
relations with Lithuania. Kaliningrad could be a major source of tension between Russia 
and Lithuania, as a consequence of instability in the oblast and as a consequence of 
Russia’s doubts about its ability to retain the exclave in the long term.  
Kaliningrad’s geographic separation, its history of changing 
ownership, and Russia’s current weakened economic and military power raise the fear of 
losing control over the oblast. There is a desire among some Kaliningrad leaders for 
greater autonomy. Moscow’s excessive bureaucratic control has become a frequent theme 
in the statements of oblast officials. They have complained that all decisions regarding 
the economy are made by bureaucrats in Moscow, not consumers or businesses based in 
the oblast. The seriousness of the current economic situation is heightened by the oblast’s 
inability to pay for food supplies and heating oil. Kaliningrad’s bleak economic prospects 
also represent a separate challenge to stability in the region. Kaliningrad could become a 
major source for illegal immigration and organized crime activity. The exclave has 
already earned a reputation as a key narcotics trafficking node and is also renowned for 
prostitution.38  
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Another of Moscow’s concerns is the weak historical claim that 
Russia has to territory that was for centuries held at various times by Germany (East 
Prussia), Lithuania (Karaliauchius), and Poland (Krolewiec).39 That these countries have 
much stronger historical relationships to the exclave is a point of concern for Russia. 
Moscow can offer the oblast no realistic prospects for further economic development in 
the long run, while the EU could economically surpass the exclave, leaving it at a severe 
disadvantage in economic relations with its neighbors. At the same time, Russia fears that 
an economically successful Kaliningrad would secede from the federation. 
 The long-term question of Russian military transit to Kaliningrad 
across Lithuanian territory could also be used to complicate relations between the two 
states. The matter has been resolved on an informal basis, with Lithuania permitting 
Russian troops to cross its territory with certain restrictions. For example, troops can only 
move by rail; prior notification is required; and soldiers must ride separately from their 
weapons. The problem here is that Russia could attempt to revise the current agreement 
and revive its demand for a guaranteed transit corridor across Lithuania territory at some 
time in the future. Various problems that could be destabilizing for Kaliningrad will arise 
after Lithuania joins the EU. Lithuania will have to solve problems such as border 
crossing rights (at present only Kaliningrad oblast residents can cross the border without 
a visa); the transit of Russia’s commercial goods and military forces and equipment; the 
protection of Lithuanian investments in Kaliningrad; and finally the civil and political 
rights of 200,000 ethnic Lithuanians in Kaliningrad. 40  The likelihood of an unstable 
situation in Kaliningrad leading to Russian aggression is quite low, but such a situation 
could be very dangerous for Lithuania.   
(3) Military Capabilities. Asking if Russia has the capabilities 
to conduct an intervention is reasonable. There are enough data to examine the Russian 
army’s capacity for aggression.  The level of military threat in the region has dropped 
dramatically since the end of the Cold War, but Lithuanians are concerned about Russia’s 
military capabilities and their possible rejuvenation in the long term. In view of Russia’s 
large number of forces in the Kaliningrad oblast and the Leningrad Military District 
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(MD), the threat to Lithuania appears quite real. According to Perry, Sweeney and 
Winner, “Russia has approximately 14,500 ground troops and 790 main battle tanks 
(MBTs) in Kaliningrad and another 49,000 troops and 980 MBTs in the Leningrad MD.” 
This is compared to 12,000 Lithuanian troops or about 21,000 troops in all the Baltic 
States. Moreover, the Baltic States do not have armored forces and combat aircraft, while 
Russia has a large amount of SU-25s, SU-27s and MIG-31s based throughout the 
Leningrad MD and Kaliningrad oblast.41   
Without doubt, such numerical analysis does not reveal the real 
strength of Russia’s forces. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s armed forces have 
deteriorated and its military capabilities have significantly decreased. The difficult 
current financial situation has also created funding shortfalls for military programs. The 
Army even lacks money for training and equipment maintenance. Russian pilots receive 
only one-fourth of flight time required to keep skills at minimum levels. Inspections in 
conjunction with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe treaty have revealed 
extremely low levels of equipment maintenance, especially in Kaliningrad. The situation 
of the Baltic Fleet has also declined. The Baltic Fleet has lost half of its main bases, 
including its largest facility in Liepaja (Latvia) and other main bases in Estonia and 
Poland. Its personnel have been cut by over fifty thousand, including six thousand 
officers. Moreover, fleet personnel suffer from payment delays and housing shortages. 
According to some reports, the Baltic Fleet faced a real prospect of food shortages in 
1998. 42   
From this perspective, Russian forces in the region may be of poor 
quality, but they still could pose a real threat to Lithuania and the whole Baltic region if 
Russia’s political orientation changed quickly. In worst-case scenarios, as some military 
analysts have pointed out, Russia could intervene in one or more of the Baltic States 
while the West was involved in another crisis. Given strong anti-Western sentiments and 
overall dissatisfaction, the Russian population (in the Kaliningrad case) might accept 
more aggressive policies toward Lithuania. Russia’s intelligence and security services, 
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the successor organizations to the KGB, may still have the ability to manipulate events in 
Lithuania in order to create a pretext for intervention.  
However, to draw a conclusion about the possible intervention, other 
issues must be considered. First, how many troops would be needed to conduct such an 
operation? Taking into account the fact that 40,000 troops failed in their campaign in 
Chechnya from 1994 to 1996, Perry, Sweeney and Winner have estimated that at least 
150,000 troops would be required to recapture and occupy the Baltic States. It is 
plausible, in their view, that the current troops in the Kaliningrad oblast and Leningrad 
MD could be enough to occupy one of the Baltic States, but more troops would be 
needed to reinforce the Kaliningrad and Belarusian border with Poland against NATO 
assistance. According to Perry, Sweeney and Winner, about one fifth of Russia’s armed 
forces might be needed for such an operation. Moreover, they have concluded, this 
operation would require control of access to the Baltic Sea, a task that is beyond the 
Baltic Fleet’s capabilities.43 Furthermore, it is uncertain whether Russia would risk its 
relations with the European Union and the United States by invading an EU member and 
NATO ally. According to military analysts, Russia is probably still too weak 
economically and militarily to run such a great risk by intervening in the Baltic States.44  
In short, Russian military intervention in Lithuania in the next 
decade is improbable. However, the future of post-Soviet Russia is still unclear, and it 
would be premature and imprudent to declare that there is no possibility that Russia could 
revert to being an authoritarian and hostile state. Obviously, a democratic Russia is still 
far off in the future. Therefore it would be very dangerous for Lithuania not to take 
measures to ensure its security, based on the unfounded assumption that Russia has 
become a democratic state; the cost of such an analytical error could be very high. In 
view of Lithuania’s relatively small economic and military capabilities and its security 
concerns, it is reasonable to define Lithuania as a “not greedy/potentially insecure” state, 
in accordance with Charles Glaser’s definition discussed in Chapter I. 
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2. Russia’s Concerns 
At this point, it is useful to look at Russia’s main concerns. It will help to 
draw a clearer picture of Russia and to understand why many Russians see Lithuania as 
more anti-East than pro-West. Russia’s main concerns are political, economic and 
military. 
a. Political Concerns 
Political concerns include domestic and great-power considerations. First, 
it is clear that the Baltic region and Lithuania in particular remain important issues for 
Russian politicians. Despite the diverse platforms and views of Russian political parties 
on various issues they all agree on one point – the need to protect Russian minorities 
abroad. Even though Russian politicians have been strong on rhetoric but weak on 
concrete action, protection of Russian minorities abroad has served as a unifying factor of 
diverse political forces. For example, one might consider the reaction to the Riga 
pensioners’ demonstration in March 1998, when even the appearance of injustice against 
ethnic Russians became a very good foundation for agreement among different political 
leaders such as Chernomirdin, Luzhkov, Zirinovskiy, Zyuganov, and Yeltsin.45 Russian 
leaders have used the issue of ethnic Russian minorities abroad for political purposes. 
Supporting oppressed ethnic Russians provides a cover for Russian politicians who seek 
to distract public attention from more serious problems.46  
Another political concern is Russia’s desire to remain a great power. The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the loss not only of huge amounts of territory but 
more importantly of superpower status have influenced Russian politicians and security 
thinkers, leaving a deep psychological mark. After an initial period of increased 
cooperation with the West, in 1996 Russia adopted a new course. During Primakov’s 
time as foreign minister, Russia tried to enhance its position in world diplomatic affairs. 
Russia took steps to improve its relations with France, Germany, Japan and China as part 
of its policy to reestablish Moscow as an important actor in world affairs. Russia’s 
insistence on full membership in the G-8 should be seen in the same perspective. The 
trilateral summit in Moscow in March 1998 between Yeltsin, then-Chancellor Helmut 
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Kohl of Germany, and French President Jacques Chirac could be seen as an attempt to 
enhance Russia’s prominence in European diplomacy while at the same time showing 
that the United States and the United Kingdom were not needed.47  
In the late 1990s, Russia continuously demonstrated that it regards the 
Baltic States as falling within its sphere of interests. The latter half of 1997 was marked 
by a number of initiatives and policy statements regarding the Baltic States. Russia 
offered unilateral security guarantees and confidence-building measures at Vilnius in 
September. In October 1997, Yeltsin announced in Stockholm unilateral force cuts of 
about 40 percent in northwest Russia as a sign of Moscow’s renewed attention to the 
Baltic States and the whole region.48  The increased importance of the Baltic States in 
U.S. foreign policy and the signing of the U.S.-Baltic charter in January 1998 have 
sparked Russia’s interest in the Baltic region, which can be viewed as an attempt to keep 
pace with the United States as a great power and to maintain its influence in the Baltic 
region and particularly in the Baltic States. Russia’s desire to reassert itself as a great 
power will continue to be an important factor in its policy toward the Baltic States and 
Lithuania in particular.  
b. Military Concerns 
Second, the most sensitive issues are the security concerns of the Russia 
military about developments in the Baltic region. These concerns can be divided into two 
categories: operational, concerning the impact of the Baltic States’ membership in 
NATO; and strategic, related to early warning and nuclear issues between Russia and the 
United States.  
The operational concerns reflect the importance of the Baltic region as an 
avenue for land, air and naval operations. Throughout history the territory of the Baltic 
States has been the corridor for ground force movements to and from northwest Russia. 
This fact was underscored by the extensive battles between German and Soviet forces in 
the Baltic region during both world wars. From a Russian perspective, two very 
important strategic areas—Moscow and the Leningrad Military District, with its huge 
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine facilities—are left unprotected from an 
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aggressor advancing from the Baltic Sea. 49 Therefore, given the historical importance of 
the Baltic States’ territory and Russia’s traditional emphasis on the buffer effect and on 
controlling its periphery in order to meet and fight an aggressor as far from the center as 
possible, the Baltic States’ membership in NATO is viewed in a negative light by 
Russian defense planners. Moreover, as the Russian Ambassador to NATO, General 
Konstantin Totskiy, emphasized, there is concern about a potential for increased NATO 
deployments. There are no force deployment limitations in the Baltic States under the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and this territory could become an 
“arms control-free zone.”50    
As military analysts have noted, the most damaging element of the loss of 
Baltic territory is that it significantly limits Russia’s ability to provide air defense over 
the Baltic Sea. This also left Russia more vulnerable to airborne reconnaissance and 
surveillance after Lithuania agreed to lend its airfields to support NATO reconnaissance 
flights. According to Perry, Sweeney and Winner,   
Russian concerns over its inability to dominate Baltic airspace are 
reflected in the renewed attention given to the air-defense forces in 
Kaliningrad. Units on the ground were among the first to be outfitted with 
the S-300 air-defense system, considered roughly the Russian equivalent 
of Patriot, and a training range for S-300 live-fire tests has been 
established in Kaliningrad near Cape Taran. The housing situation in the 
air-defense forces is also considered to be better than in other units in the 
oblast.51  
 
Kaliningrad cannot compensate for the loss of air-defense facilities in the 
Baltic States, but the Russians are determined to strengthen Kaliningrad as a forward air-
defense post bordering NATO territory.  
The last set of concerns involves nuclear planning and strategic early 
warning in relations between Russia and the United States. This issue is quite sensitive 
for two reasons. First, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia lost some early-
warning radars. As pointed out by Perry, Sweeney and Winner,  
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The partially completed LPAR [large phased-array radar] at Skrunda in 
Latvia was destroyed, by mutual agreement with Russia, in 1995. Aside 
from LPARs, eleven older Hen House radars form the main component of 
Russia’s early-warning radars.52  
 
Though Defense Minister Sergeyev has argued that Russia will be able to 
compensate for the loss of Skrunda with space-based systems until the new Baranovichi 
site in Belarussia is fully operational, some analysts note that disadvantages exist in both 
the land-based and space-based early-warning systems.53  
Second, the NATO membership of the Baltic States would raise Russian 
concerns over the vulnerability of Russia itself to NATO tactical nuclear weapons. 
During the debate over the first post-Cold War round of NATO enlargement Defense 
Minister Igor Rodionov noted that “the addition of Polish territory would theoretically 
allow NATO dual-capable aircraft (DCA) to deliver tactical nuclear weapons as far east 
as Bryansk, Smolensk, and Kursk.”54 From a Russian perspective, the NATO 
membership of the Baltic States would bring the Alliance closer to Russian territory, 
making tactical weapons more strategically significant. Russian observers have expressed 
such concerns even though the NATO-Russian Founding Act includes the following 
statement:  
The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan 
and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, 
nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear 
policy—and do not foresee any future need to do so.55    
  
Overall NATO’s enlargement is seen in Russia as a Western policy 
contrary to Russian interests.  According to Nadia Arbatova, “NATO’s expansion to 
almost a three-fold superiority over Russia, closer to Russian borders without any threat 
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from Russia, was envisaged by the majority of Russia’s political and strategic elite as 
much more illustrative evidence of intentions than official NATO declarations.”56 
c. Economic Concerns 
Finally, Russia has economic interests in the Baltic States. These countries 
are attractive to Russia because of their geographic position. They have served as a 
“bridge” for transferring Russia’s goods to Europe and further to the West. Historically 
Baltic ports have been the main trade route for Russian goods shipped by sea. Baltic ports 
are ice-free all year, and this makes them attractive and advantageous for Russia. A 
significant portion of Russia’s oil and natural gas exports, about 11 to 12 percent, is 
distributed via Baltic ports. Another Russian economic concern is that Lithuania plays a 
significant role in connecting the Kaliningrad district with Russia. More than 40% of 
transit to Kaliningrad goes through Lithuania.57 However, the membership of the Baltic 
States in the EU will transform disputes and crises between Russia and any Baltic State 
into disputes between Moscow and Brussels. This circumstance may greatly reduce 
Russia’s ability to push its policy in the region.  
At this point, it is possible to determine whether and to what extent 
Russia’s policy is driven by opportunity and/or by needs. As this research has shown, 
Russia has some legitimate concerns, including security, but at the same time Russia may 
seek to enhance its great-power status and dominate the Baltic States in political, 
economic, and military terms. Domestic concerns about economic and security needs 
could be used as an opportunity to commit aggression. Military concerns may look like 
needs, but if one’s own security is improved by diminishing another’s security, these 
concerns are in fact motivated by opportunity. In the current difficult economic situation 
in Russia, economic concerns are probably driven by genuine needs. The great power 
concerns are, however, clearly driven by opportunistic motives. This analysis concludes 
that Russia’s concerns are probably driven by both needs and opportunity. Therefore it is 
reasonable to label Russia a “greedy/potentially non-secure” state, in terms of the 
definitions set forth in Chapter I.  
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III. DETERRENCE TO MEET LITHUANIA’S SECURITY NEEDS 
Lithuania's position in the international security system is at its “best over the past 
decade”, and the best way to maintain this position is through the nation’s membership in 
the European Union (EU) and NATO, according to the National Security Strategy 
adopted at the parliament's session on 28 May 2002.  “The Republic of Lithuania now 
sees no direct military threat for its national security, [and] therefore, [it] does not 
consider any foreign country its enemy.” The main security planners in Vilnius, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense (MND), agree that the 
possibility of any organized external military threat to Lithuania over the next several 
years is relatively low. But at the same time “the main task for the near future is to 
achieve membership of NATO.”58 Full integration into the Alliance is viewed by the 
political leadership as the most important condition for Lithuanian security and 
independence in the long term. Moreover, according to the White Paper on defense, “The 
Lithuanian national defence system shall be directed towards the development of military 
forces for state defence that are interoperable with NATO or as its component.”59 
It is obvious that Lithuanian membership in NATO could play a role as a 
deterrent to Russian aggression or coercion in the short and long terms. The main reason 
for this membership, as it was concluded in the previous chapter, is that there is lingering 
concern with regard to potential instability in Russia, and its possible spillover effect on 
Lithuania. This concern was confirmed by a major public opinion survey on security 
issues, conducted in March 1998 on behalf of NATO’s Office of Information and the 
Press and the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry. According to this survey, the second most 
important threat to Lithuania’s security after crime and corruption (30.3%) was instability 
in Russia (21.7%). Moreover, 69 percent of Lithuania’s population think that their 
security is not sufficiently protected; therefore integration with the West via NATO and 
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the EU is the only route to domestic and regional stability.60  Lithuanians have real 
concerns about Russia, and these concerns are not groundless. NATO membership offers 
Lithuania the possibility of deterrence to meet its concerns, but deterrence policies also 
have some limitations. Despite difficulties of predicting the outcome of deterrence 
efforts, some tentative conclusions can be drawn in view of the main deterrence theories 
and current trends in international politics and in Lithuanian-Russian relations in 
particular.  
A. EVALUATING SUCCESS OF DETERRENCE  
Assuming that there is a possibility of direct aggression, it is prudent to attempt to 
prevent it through deterrence in order to ensure Lithuania’s security. Lithuania’s 
politicians see NATO and a strong defense system as tools of deterrence. The question is 
how to make it credible and to what extent deterrence may be effective. 
According to deterrence theory, the success of a deterrence strategy depends on 
several factors, including the defender’s capabilities and the strength of his resolve. Other 
relevant factors include strategic, domestic and psychological circumstances. Because of 
its limited scope, this paper concentrates on the following variables: on the defender’s 
side, resolve and the capabilities to deter the opponent; on the adversary’s side, strategic 
vulnerabilities and domestic political factors. 
1. Capability of Defender 
 There is no question that NATO has military capabilities that might deter Russia, 
especially taking into account Russia’s military weaknesses discussed in the previous 
chapter. Moreover, some Russian observers hold that NATO’s expansion has 
significantly improved its strategic position. According to Alexei Arbatov, the traditional 
East-West balance of conventional forces has changed in favor of NATO armed forces to 
an almost three-fold superiority compared to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
armed forces. In comparison with the USSR’s position from the late 1940s to the late 
1990s, Moscow’s present military power has been drawn back 1,500 kilometers from the 
center of Europe. The Moscow military district has turned from the deep rear area into 
the forward edge of Russian defense, while the operational depth of NATO in Europe has 
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increased by some 15 to 20 percent.61 Although “Russia’s military power will still remain 
substantially constrained by the country’s weak economy and adverse demographic and 
health trends,” it is prudent to keep NATO capable of conducting Article 5 missions. 62     
Lithuania’s capabilities offer a more complicated picture. The present capability 
of the Lithuanian armed forces to defend the nation is limited. The one active, ready 
motorized infantry brigade is judged by analysts as being capable of delaying a division-
size ground attack for a short period of time along one major avenue, or defending one 
major city against such an attack for a brief time. Furthermore, Lithuania’s ground forces 
have no advanced equipment or weapons such as anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and transport 
systems. The capabilities of the Lithuanian Navy and Air Forces are far from what would 
be required to deter Russia. Moreover, a nation-wide mobilization would likely raise no 
more than half the total required for defense, and half of them would be inadequately 
armed and trained. Finally, the National Defense Voluntary Force (NDVF) has to be 
well-integrated with the regular forces. Therefore Lithuania is now pursuing two major 
objectives in its long-term defense plan: 
• Building a flexible self-defense force able to implement the nation’s 
total defense concept; and 
• Achieving service-wide interoperability with NATO forces.63   
 
The importance of Lithuanian army capabilities has two aspects. First, to be 
accepted in NATO and enjoy its defense umbrella, Lithuania had to ensure that its Armed 
Forces could meet certain requirements. According to NATO’s Membership Action Plan 
(MAP), the candidate states need to meet training requirements to ensure their ability to 
cooperate fully with NATO (including fluency in NATO’s working languages and 
familiarity with its operational concepts); achieve comparable management procedures 
and standards (including an administrative capacity for logistics, functional defense 
planning, budgeting and programming and personnel management); complete the 
restructuring of the armed forces (including increasing the proportion of non-
commissioned officers and reducing the average age of troops); enhance military 
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capabilities (including combat, air-defense, logistics, rapid reaction forces and 
infrastructure); modernize and improve equipment (including naval, air forces, air 
surveillance and communications); establish the legal framework for the protection of 
confidential information; adapt the constitution in order to respond when necessary to an 
invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty; and adopt documents specifying a new 
national security strategy, defense strategy, military strategy, civil defense, and military 
long-term development and equipment plans for supporting the new Strategic Concept of 
the Atlantic Alliance.64 
 Second, in the case of a requirement for direct immediate deterrence (or defense), 
even as a NATO member, Lithuania could not expect to receive military assistance 
quickly. The arrival time of allied forces could vary from several days to weeks. 
Lithuania would have to defend its territory for some period of time using its own armed 
forces. In theory, it would be possible to reinforce Lithuania’s defense on major avenues 
of assault, if warning of an attack were received at an early enough point. Though it is 
obvious that Lithuanian forces could not withstand an enemy assault for an indefinite 
time, the MND hopes that the fully mobilized reserve with small regular forces and with 
district-based units of the NDVF would be able to fend off defeat pending the arrival of 
external assistance.65  
At this point, taking into consideration the current situation and probable future 
circumstances, NATO’s capability to deter Russian aggression or coercion is probably 
sufficient, but there might be weakness in a case requiring extended immediate 
deterrence. Therefore Lithuania, as a member of NATO, should not miss any opportunity 
to improve its armed forces and be prepared for self-defense as well as for defense with 
NATO assistance.  
2. Credibility of Defender’s Resolve 
The issue of credibility is more complicated. Credibility depends on the ability to 
send persuasive signals of the defender’s resolve to use force. It also depends upon the 
bargaining strategy that a defender employs.66 The credibility of Lithuania’s resolve 
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would be high because of the importance of the issues at stake in the case of a Russian 
intervention that might lead to tremendous human and other losses—including an end of 
the nation’s independence. However, Lithuania’s credibility could be a weak point 
because it might not be able to send persuasive signals, owing to a desire not to raise 
tensions with Russia; and it could not match Russia’s strength in the bargaining process. 
NATO members are bound by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty to defend a threatened 
ally, but the nature of their action in support of their commitment may vary from country 
to country depending on their domestic policy preferences.  
No doubt, the commitment of the United States is strong. It refused to 
acknowledge the Soviet Union’s annexation of the Baltic States, and it continues to 
support the Baltic States in the military sphere. On 16 January 1998, a Charter of 
Partnership among the United State and Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia was signed.67 For 
FY 2003 the U.S. allocated approximately $1.5 million in Foreign Military Founding 
(FMF) funds and in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds for 
Lithuania.68 The United States remains the main supporter of the Baltic States in the 
process of their integration into NATO. 
At this point, it appears that the credibility of NATO is probably high enough to 
deter Russian aggression or coercion, but in case of the United States’ withdrawal from 
Europe (an unlikely event in the foreseeable future) it could be significantly weakened, 
making deterrence less credible. Lithuania’s ability to pursue policies to ensure its 
security alone would be insufficient in such circumstances.  
3. Strategic Vulnerability of Opponent 
Another key variable determining outcomes in tests of deterrence strategies is 
strategic vulnerability. According to Stein, this vulnerability could be caused by changes 
in the balance of military capabilities that work against a challenger (an unfavorable shift 
in the balance of power) or by the “security dilemma.” In the latter case, “behavior 
perceived by adversaries as threatening and aggressive is a defensive response to an 
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inhospitable strategic environment.”69 The first case is less probable with Russia in the 
future because it has already experienced this kind of decline without dangerous 
disturbance. In the second case, it is posited that under conditions of the security 
dilemma, an insecure government is likely to exaggerate the hostility of an adversary. In 
other words, defensive actions intended to protect the Baltic States as NATO members 
might be misunderstood by Russia as actions directed against its security interests. 
Two events—NATO’s July 1997 enlargement decision and NATO’s March-June 
1999 air campaign in the Kosovo conflict—confirm the possibility that Russians might 
exaggerate their security concerns. According to Nadia Arbatova, NATO’s July 1997 
Madrid decision to expand had a very negative impact on the Russian political elite’s 
security perceptions and consequently on Russian foreign and security policy. NATO is 
perceived in Russia as an alliance designed as a defense against Russia. In the NATO-
Russia Founding Act, the NATO Allies made the following commitments: 
The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan 
and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, 
nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear 
policy—and do not foresee any future need to do so…. NATO reiterates 
that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will 
carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the 
necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement 
rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat 
forces.70 
 
The fact that these were political commitments and not legally binding obligations 
reinforced Russia’s suspicions about NATO’s motives in enlargement and led to 
exaggerated security concerns in Russia. Moreover, after NATO’s air strikes in the 
Kosovo conflict in 1999, the NATO bloc was again considered the main potential enemy 
and the major threat to Russia.71 It seems that Russia’s new military strategy was formed 
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according to this assessment; this can be confirmed by recently conducted military 
exercises that included simulated nuclear strikes against NATO countries.72  
In short, strategic vulnerability can affect perceptions, with implications for the 
effectiveness of deterrence strategies. However, it is important to take into consideration 
recent positive trends in Russian foreign policy—closer relations with NATO and a more 
constructive dialogue with West. The negative effect of strategic vulnerability may be 
diminished if this rapprochement continues.    
4. Domestic Politics 
Domestic political factors may have an influence on the outcome of attempts to 
employ deterrence strategies because shifts in the balance of domestic political power 
may lead to changes in policy. Moderates prefer defensive strategies, seek more 
cooperative policies, and employ unilateral restraints, arms control and diplomacy in 
maintaining good relations with neighbors. Hard-liners rely more on competitive foreign 
policies.73 Russia’s current policy suggests that moderates are influential at present. 
Under such conditions hardliners may gain influence by arguing that the defenders’ 
supposedly “threatening” policies are caused by their own non-assertive policies. For 
example, Russia’s excessive expressions of concern about NATO enlargement were and 
still are mainly promoted by domestic forces seeking political advantages.  
According to David Yost, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo “stimulated the 
already powerful anti-Western currents in Russian politics.” 74  Furthermore, according to 
Alexei Arbatov, within Russian security organizations and the Duma “serious discussions 
took place concerning [potential] military conflict with NATO.”75  
Some Russian analysts and politicians see NATO enlargement and the Alliance’s 
military intervention in the Kosovo conflict as evidence of the US or even German 
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assertiveness. In the eyes of Russian observers, “the United States is seen to be taking 
advantage of Russia’s weakness to impose an American-designed European security 
order.” 76 According to Anton Surikov, a radical Russian nationalist, NATO enlargement 
is “an attempt by Germany to resume its expansion in the eastern and south-eastern 
directions.” In Anton Surikov’s view, the only way to stop this expansion is “restraining 
NATO with nuclear weapons” deployments in various places, including Kaliningrad, and 
on ships in the Baltic Sea. Moreover, Surikov wrote, “nobody intends to fight with Russia 
for the Baltic countries,” owing in part to Russia’s nuclear forces, “one of the few 
convincing arguments for the West.”77 However, not only radical nationalists have such 
ideas. Vladimir Lukin, a mainstream Russian politician, expressed a similar idea 
regarding NATO’s expansion:  
If the blind egoism of the shortsighted politicians to the west of our 
borders prevails we will resort to the means we still have in our hands. 
These are means of some kind of desperation, but effective nonetheless.78 
 
NATO’s military intervention in Yugoslavia seriously strengthened anti-Western 
hardliners in Moscow and consequently triggered negative consequences. It “produced 
the most traumatic impact on Russia’s official and unofficial attitudes towards the 
Alliance.”79 Moscow’s negative reaction to NATO’s actions was expressed by 
suspending certain elements of dialogue and cooperation with the Alliance. Despite the 
renewal of improved relations with NATO in early 2000, Russia’s new military doctrine 
in April 2000 confirmed a negative view of the Alliance’s military posture, NATO’s 
enlargement, and the air strikes in the Kosovo conflict. Furthermore, NATO’s 
intervention in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 not only strengthened nationalist and 
communist political forces in Russia, but “also aroused anti-Western political forces” in 
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Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine.80 According to Dmitri Glinski-Vassiliev, 
“NATO expansion was seen negatively not just by nationalists, but often more so by 
democrats and Westernisers.81 According to Nadia Arbatova, “As for Russian 
democrats… who contributed personally to the process of democratization of the USSR 
and Eastern Europe, they now have a bitter feeling of having been betrayed by their 
former political allies in the United States, Western and Central Europe.” 82 
One more factor should be mentioned here before drawing conclusions about the 
importance of domestic politics. Russia’s foreign policy is highly dependent on one 
person—the president. Despite the important role of the Duma in domestic politics, under 
Vladimir Putin’s rule the Duma’s influence over foreign policy has weakened. This weak 
influence can be seen as positive because, despite the strong opposition to better relations 
with the West expressed in the Duma, Russia’s president has been able to pursue more 
cooperative policies toward the West. Of course, such strong reliance on one-man rule 
could have a negative effect—the election of a new president could lead to dramatic 
changes in Russian policy toward NATO and the West.           
This evidence shows how important domestic forces are in influencing the 
country’s foreign and security policies. In some circumstances NATO’s deterrence 
strategies might have the unintended result of shifting the balance of power toward hard-
liners who favor competitive policies instead of cooperation; this might increase tensions 
between NATO and Russia. Changes in the presidency could lead to unanticipated 
changes in foreign policy and thus cause huge disturbances in relations between Russia 
and the Alliance.   
B. LIMITATIONS OF DETERRENCE 
Any theory or policy of deterrence has its limitations. NATO’s deterrence in the 
case of Lithuania is no exception. Deterrence could fail because of technical problems, 
domestic or political constraints, and/or misperceptions. 
First, deterrence could fail because of technical problems. According to Huth, in a 
case requiring extended-immediate deterrence, NATO, and particularly the United States, 
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would face the problem of deploying its forces in large numbers beyond its borders. 
Mobilizing and transporting substantial forces could take a long time, but an extended-
immediate deterrence situation would require a rapid movement of forces into position to 
repulse an attack. However, this argument could become less important if this issue was 
examined from another perspective. The example of West Berlin during the Cold War 
demonstrated that a strategically small area could be protected by strategies of deterrence. 
Therefore, it is plausible that a small group of NATO soldiers stationed in Lithuania 
could be sufficient to deter Russian aggression or coercion.   
Second, deterrence could fail because of domestic or political constraints. In other 
words, owing to domestic considerations (their own security, economic or political 
interests), some countries could fail to express strong commitments to defend their ally. 
For example, one of the causes of World War I was Britain’s weak commitment to the 
Triple Entente. According to John Orme, in the absence of consensus in the British 
government (the Cabinet remained divided over the crisis in Eastern Europe until the 
German invasion of Belgium), the British were unable to persuade the Germans of their 
resolve and to take decisive actions. Therefore the Germans thought that Britain was 
likely to remain neutral.83 Another example is from World War II. In September 1939, 
when Germany attacked Poland, Warsaw’s allies— Britain and France—failed to help 
Poland, even after their declaration of war against Germany. Although the Royal Navy 
engaged in operations against the German navy in the fall of 1939 and established a naval 
blockade of Germany, Britain and France did not “attack Germany on its western front.” 
84  
A more recent example is Germany’s reluctance to send an Alphajet squadron to 
Turkey in January 1991 as part of the forces whose purpose was to defend Turkey during 
the Gulf War. Although Germany sent its Alphajet squadron and air defense units within 
a month, the delay mainly stemmed from domestic concerns.85 In addition, the successful 
deployment of allied forces could be undercut by domestic and political factors that 
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might prevent leaders from implementing more effective policies.86 Therefore it is 
reasonable to assume that under certain conditions the credibility of allies could be weak.    
Finally, misperceptions may cause deterrence failure. According to Stein, 
individual psychological biases such as cognitive “schemata,” “scripts,” and “heuristics” 
may distort the process of attribution, estimation, and judgment.87 These factors may 
negatively affect decision-making. Senior officers of Russia’s military who were 
educated during the Cold War may be inclined to exaggerate the offensive potential of 
NATO forces and to impute malicious intentions to the Alliance.  
This can be explained by the strong influence of historical experiences. People 
tend to interpret events in terms of familiar patterns. This “worldview” helps decision-
makers reach better judgments if the original conditions continue to be present, but makes 
it harder for them to operate under different conditions. According to Robert Jervis,  
if an actor’s environment consistently presents him with certain problems 
and opportunities, he will be predisposed to see later situations as fitting 
the earlier pattern…. An actor’s contact with another on an important issue 
can establish so firm an image of him that it will be very hard to 
dislodge…. This means that images become over generalized as 
expectations established from behavior in one set of circumstances are 
carried over into quite different situations…. More generally, states that 
have been expansionist under one set of circumstances or leaders are 
likely to be seen as posing a continuing threat.88 
 
These psychological biases may prevail in Russia’s military, making 
misperceptions possible. This may worsen relations and escalate tensions. High-ranking 
Russian military and political officials still see NATO as a possible threat. However, 
considering Russia’s relative military weakness, at least for the upcoming decade, 
NATO’s efforts to promote cooperation, and the continuing retirement of the military 
leadership’s “old guard,” the probability of misperceptions may decline. 
There may also be some other limitations to NATO’s strategies of deterrence. 
First, it is not clear how NATO may be affected by the European Union’s European 
Security and Defense Policy, and it is not clear how its military doctrine will change with 
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the acceptance of new members. It is not clear whether and how NATO’s defense 
doctrine will change with the membership of the Baltic States in NATO. Second, as with 
other such organizations, NATO membership implies obligations for the member states. 
States should follow certain rules and procedures accepted by all members. All member 
states participate in decision-making, but their influence will be a function of their 
contribution and their political weight. This is especially true for new members. 
At this point, taking into consideration the current situation and probable future 
events, it appears that 
• NATO’s capability to deter Russia’s aggression or coercion is probably 
sufficient, but there may be weakness in a case requiring extended-
immediate deterrence; 
• The credibility of NATO to pursue policies to ensure Lithuania’s security 
is high, but in the event of U.S. withdrawal from Europe (an unlikely 
circumstance), it could be significantly weakened, making deterrence less 
credible; 
• Deterrence strategies could fail because of technical problems, political 
constraints (in a case requiring extended immediate deterrence), or 
misperceptions (in some circumstances, the “threat” posed by NATO 
could be exaggerated by Russian leaders) and cognitive failures; 
• In some circumstances NATO’s policies of deterrence might shift the 
domestic balance of power in Russia toward hardliners, and as a result 
yield competitive foreign policies and increased tensions between Russia 
and NATO; and 
• Shifts in domestic political forces (particularly involving the Duma and 
the president) could initiate dramatic changes in Russian foreign policy, 
causing deterrence failure. 
Lithuania’s membership in NATO gives it an opportunity to deal with its eastern 
neighbor on a more equal basis. NATO may be able to deter the threat of Russian 
aggression or coercion and provide assurance, in view of the uncertainty of future 
political and economic developments in Russia. NATO membership can assure 
Lithuanian security, while Lithuania is creating its armed forces and improving its whole 
39 
defense system as a contribution to the Alliance. NATO also can assure Lithuanian 
security in the long run, in the event that authoritarian rule returns in Russia. In order to 
compensate for the limitations of deterrence strategies and mitigate some potential 
negative impacts of deterrence policies, Lithuania should take the following measures: 
• Improve its armed forces and be prepared for defense with NATO assistance 
as well as for self-defense contingencies; and  
• Employ reassurance policies to mitigate the consequences of possible 
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IV. REASSURANCE AND COOPERATIVE POLICIES TO 
MITIGATE RUSSIA’S CONCERNS 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the majority of potential threats to 
Lithuanian security arise, directly or indirectly, from Russia. In the case of direct threats, 
including political or economic coercion or military aggression, Russia is the likely 
source of danger.  Thus, strategies to deter possible threats are needed in the foreseeable 
future, but as previous analysis shows, deterrence strategies have their limitations and 
may fail. Many Russians view the membership of the Baltic States in NATO as 
threatening. Assuming that reassurance policies may help to mitigate hostility and 
mistrust, reducing fears and the possibility of misperceptions, it may be prudent in certain 
circumstances to employ more cooperative policies toward Russia. 
However, it is important to know, given that Lithuania has become a member of 
NATO, to what extent reassurance and cooperative policies can ensure Lithuania’s 
security while maintaining constructive relations with Russia. Two questions may help to 
answer the main one. First, to what extent have reassurance and cooperative policies 
toward Russia been successful? Second, what have been the limitations of reassurance 
and cooperative policies and under what conditions have they been successful?  
The main factors examined in this chapter to assess the outcomes of reassurance 
and cooperative policies are Russia’s motivations and domestic politics. Before 
beginning the analysis, it is useful to define some terms and basic assumptions that are 
used to assess specific cases. According to Janice Stein and Charles Glaser, if an 
adversary is driven largely by domestic political needs or strategic weaknesses and is 
concerned largely with his own security (“non-greedy but insecure”), then a reassurance 
policy may be more effective than a strategy of deterrence. If an adversary’s motives are 
only driven by gains (“greedy and always secure”), then a reassurance strategy may fail. 
In a situation of mixed motives (“not-greedy but potentially insecure”), reassurance may 
be more effective as a complement to deterrence.89  
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As discussed in Chapter III, domestic factors may affect the outcomes of attempts 
to employ reassurance policies in two ways. If the majority of ruling forces within the 
potential adversary state are democratic, the strategy of reassurance will probably 
strengthen the position of the soft-liners, confirming the success of their cooperative 
policies, and weaken the position of the hard-liners, who stand for policies of coercion. 
However, if the preponderance of influential forces is non-democratic, the hard-liners 
will gain support if they convince others that cooperative policies are evidence of the 
success of their coercive policies. Also, shifts in the balance of domestic power between 
the moderates and hard-liners can alter policies. Moderates are more prone to adopt 
defensive strategies, exercise unilateral restraint, and pursue arms control and diplomacy, 
while hardliners emphasize more competitive policies in dealing with other countries. In 
the long run reassurance and cooperative policies may correct foreign leaders’ 
misperceptions of hostility, reduce perceived levels of threat, and lessen the political 
power of hardliners.90  
Assuming the feasibility of gaining positive effects through reassurance and 
cooperative policies on such important factors as a potential adversary’s motivations and 
domestic politics, it is reasonable to expect that reassurance policies could improve 
Lithuanian-Russian relations and consequently affect Lithuanian security positively. 
However, this hypothesis needs to be tested it by evaluating cases in which reassurance 
and cooperative policies toward Russia have been used. Three cases are examined: 
NATO enlargement, Russian troop withdrawal from Lithuania, and the Kaliningrad issue.  
A. NATO ENLARGEMENT 
  The first case is the process of NATO enlargement. The United States and other 
NATO countries adopted reassurance and cooperative policies toward Russia in order to 
facilitate the Alliance’s eastward expansion. These policies were successful in 
overcoming Russia’s resistance to NATO’s enlargement—the main obstacle to the 
admission of Central and Eastern European countries into NATO. 
 In the beginning, the idea of NATO enlargement was not widely supported. 
According to Ronald Asmus, some officials in the U.S. government felt that the 
enlargement might threaten America’s interest in supporting Russian reform; it could 
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lead to negative consequences by “playing into the hands of anti-democratic and anti-
Western forces in Moscow.”91 Moreover, Western European countries also did not 
support NATO enlargement and this lack of support was not groundless. NATO’s 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General John Shalikashvili, reportedly 
believed in 1993 that “NATO members, including the U.S., were not prepared to extend 
new security guarantees to potentially unstable new members…[and that] Moscow would 
inevitably view NATO enlargement as aimed against it.”92 Recognizing that Russia 
would oppose the enlargement, a German diplomat, Klaus Scharioth, suggested pursuing 
NATO-Russia cooperative policies in order to “address Moscow’s concerns and 
overcome Russian paranoia about the Alliance.”93 However, an impetus for concrete 
policies to approach Russia in this regard was gained only after 25 August 1993, when 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Polish President Lech Walesa signed a communiqué 
stating that Moscow did not object to Poland joining NATO.94  
Further developments confirmed that an important factor influencing NATO’s 
decision on enlargement was Russia’s domestic politics. Russia’s motivation was mainly 
security-driven—to minimize the negative consequences of NATO’s enlargement or, in 
other words, to minimize its strategic vulnerability after the enlargement. The process of 
approaching NATO enlargement can be divided into two important steps—the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council 
(PJC)—that helped encourage Russia to agree to further NATO expansion.    
1. Partnership for Peace 
An important initial step toward improved cooperation between NATO and 
Russia was launching the PfP in 1994. PfP had multiple purposes, and one of them was to 
prepare candidates for membership without alienating Russia. According to Janice Stein, 
the United States used a strategy of restraint in order to minimize the negative domestic 
pressure on the Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, and on the pro-Western democratic 
forces supporting him. Further events confirmed the proposition that Russian policy 
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toward the PfP was shaped by domestic factors—in particular, the struggle for power 
between the President and the Duma, and the 1996 Presidential elections—and Russia’s 
strategic vulnerabilities. 
 In January 1994 in Moscow, during Clinton’s trip in Europe, Yeltsin supported 
the PfP. Yet, according to Ronald Asmus, there was one obstacle inhibiting Russia to join 
the PfP—domestic politics.  First, there was the growing domestic pressure to adopt a 
more assertive policy toward the West. Nationalists and communists, dominating the 
Duma in 1994, saw PfP as a covert program for NATO’s enlargement and increased 
influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Second, in Yeltsin’s view, Russia, as “a great 
country with a great army with nuclear weapons,” required a special status in its relations 
with NATO. As Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev said during a NATO 
Defense Ministers’ meeting in Brussels in May 1994, Russia sought a relationship 
“adequate to its weight.”95 These objectives could be understood as a way to satisfy the 
Duma and strengthen Russia’s status in the eyes of the public after Moscow’s huge losses 
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
Despite negative domestic pressure, Russia signed the PfP Framework Document 
in June 1994. This outcome could be explained as a result of two factors. First, President 
Yeltsin misperceived PfP as an alternative to NATO enlargement. Yeltsin and other 
Russians had a mistaken impression that the Western powers had promised during the 
negotiations on Germany’s unification that NATO would not be enlarged beyond the 
territory of the former German Democratic Republic.96 Second, President Yeltsin 
strongly influenced Russia’s foreign policy. William Smirnov called Yeltsin’s regime a 
political system of “superpresidentialism with only a fig leaf parliament.”97 The President 
determined the basic guidelines of foreign policy, the executive branch formulated and 
implemented it, and the Duma sometimes had little to say during this process. Yeltsin 
made his decisions despite domestic pressure. Yet he was strongly concerned about the 
                                                 
95 Yeltsin and Grachev quoted in Ronald Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade 
Itself for a New Era, 70-71. 
96 Cooperation with Former Adversaries, Chapter 3 in David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The 
Alliance’s New Roles in International Security (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
1998), 133. 
97 William V. Smirnov, “Democratization in Russia: Achievements and Problems,” in Archie Brown, 
Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 523.   
45 
negative consequences of opposition from domestic forces. For example, on 28 
September 1994, during his visit in Washington, Yeltsin argued that the Visegrad States 
(namely, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) could join NATO, but this step 
would cause a severe reaction in Russia—strengthening antidemocratic forces that he was 
“trying to keep down.”98  
After the initial meetings between the United States and Russia, Russia’s position 
started to change from an unconditional “No” to NATO expansion to a possible “Yes” 
under certain conditions.99 President Yeltsin agreed to enlargement under two 
conditions—the process of expansion should be gradual and lengthy and Russia should 
not be excluded from NATO.100 This was the sign that Russia understood the 
inevitability of NATO enlargement, as a result of its economic weakness and the 
dependence of its reforms on support from Western countries, especially the United 
States. Therefore Russia started to accept NATO enlargement but under certain 
conditions, and these conditions were clarified during further interactions between Russia 
and the United States.    
The next round of discussions between the United States and Russia, which took 
place in Geneva on 17-18 January 1995, confirmed the importance of domestic factors in 
determining Russian policy. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, during a private 
meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, revealed the main problem 
with NATO—the widespread view in Russia that the Alliance was still an organization 
inimical to Russia. Therefore, to make progress in NATO-Russia relations, the Alliance 
needed to address Russian concerns regarding the supposedly antagonistic nature of the 
Alliance, Russia’s public perception of the Alliance, the “closed and cumbersome” 
Alliance decision making process, and psychological fears of a military alliance 
approaching closer to the country’s borders. This time Moscow clearly defined how 
NATO could address its concerns. First, the Russians sought a change in the Alliance’s 
orientation, so that it would become a more inclusive, political organization. Second, the 
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Russians proposed the creation of an institutionalized consultative mechanism for joint 
decision-making and asked the Allies to leave open the option of Russian membership. 
Third, the Russians asked that NATO conventional and nuclear forces not be moved 
eastward during the expansion.101 These concerns revealed the most likely motivations 
behind Russia’s policies toward NATO’s enlargement, namely its need to address the 
domestic political elite’s demands and the domestic audience’s uneasiness about NATO 
expansion, as well as to minimize the strategic vulnerability of Russia.   
However, at this stage of negotiations, the most important goal of Russian policy 
toward NATO’s enlargement was to arrest its speed. According to Moscow, the best 
timeline for NATO enlargement should be 10 to 20 years or at least 5 to 7 years.102 The 
two driving forces behind this goal involved domestic politics and strategic 
considerations. Domestically, Yeltsin’s government hoped to have an agreement with 
NATO by the end of 1995 to ensure a better environment for the presidential elections in 
1996 and to make the enlargement process less threatening for the president and the 
political elite that supported him. This was confirmed by Yeltsin’s wariness about NATO 
enlargement in March 1995. Russian politicians were competing to use anti-NATO 
rhetoric in trying to score points against Yeltsin. Strategically, Russia wanted to be 
prepared militarily for NATO’s enlargement—to reform its Army and to change its 
doctrine. A greater reliance on its nuclear forces gave Russia breathing space to 
implement its plans. However, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, 
admitted, during his meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Geneva 
in March 1995, Russia’s concerns were driven largely by political rather than strategic 
considerations.103  
Only after the United States promised to pursue enlargement “not too fast” did 
Russia agree to sign the necessary documents that facilitated further dialogue on NATO 
enlargement. During a meeting in Moscow on 10 May 1995, President Clinton proposed 
that if Russia participated in PfP and the two sides agreed on building a NATO-Russia 
relationship, the U.S. would support the idea that Russia would not be excluded from 
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NATO membership and that the process of enlargement would be slow and cautious to 
prevent problems during the 1996 presidential elections in Russia. Russian President 
Yeltsin agreed and thereafter, during the NATO ministerial meeting in the Netherlands 
on 26 May 1995, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev signed Russia’s Individual 
Partnership Program (IPP) and a second document called “Areas of Profound Dialogue 
between Russia and NATO.”104  
The way in which Russia approached the PfP confirms that the domestic political 
factor was important in shaping Russia’s policy toward NATO enlargement. The Russian 
president’s fight with the Duma for power to influence foreign policy and his 
vulnerability to domestic pressures during the elections were the main driving forces 
behind Russian policy from December 1993 to February 1996.  The United States’ 
cooperative policies and strategy of restraint were successful in persuading Russia to 
approve the PfP documents that positively influenced the overall process of NATO 
enlargement.  
2. NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council  
The second step in the West’s development of cooperative policies toward Russia 
was creating the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). At this stage of 
interactions between the United States and Russia, it appears that Russia’s domestic 
politics and strategic vulnerability were the main factors shaping Russia’s policy toward 
NATO enlargement. Using the terminology proposed by Janice Stein and Charles Glaser, 
it appears that Russia’s motives in essence were security driven. To mitigate Russia’s 
concerns, besides the usual diplomacy, the strategies of restraint and reciprocity were 
used.   
As noted above, domestic politics influenced Russian policies on NATO 
enlargement. The main problem for Yeltsin’s government was not the enlargement itself 
but the attitudes of some leading politicians who attempted to use this issue to try to 
consolidate their position and to persuade the nation that Russia was facing an external 
threat. Andrey Kozyrev  
blamed forces directly linked with Russia’s powerful arms industry and 
special services for an anti-Western turn in Russian foreign policy. He 
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commented on these forces’ efforts to convince president Yeltsin to pursue 
a more anti-Western policy and to present NATO enlargement as a threat 
to Russia’s security as an attempt to consolidate their power and to stop 
democratic reforms in Russia.105 
 
 Former Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Aleksandr 
Lebed held the same position and in an interview said, “The policy of democratic 
changes and reforms that has been pursued over the last five years in Russia is now in a 
stalemate. They [antidemocratic forces] are following a well-known route: seeking an 
external enemy.”106 Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to surmise that to 
undermine the foundation for such forces in “seeking an external enemy” some steps to 
address Russia’s strategic concerns were needed.      
Therefore, during the next stage of negotiations, the strategic factor became more 
important, and military issues gained prominence. Talks on NATO-Russia relations 
between the United States and Russia started in September 1996 in New York. 
Understanding that Moscow could not stop NATO enlargement, Russia tried to limit this 
process as much as possible, and by doing so it actually reduced the possible costs of 
enlargement. According to Evgeny Primakov, “the main thing for us was to prepare a 
document which would define a mutually acceptable development of our relations with 
NATO, which would promote the transformation of the Alliance from a Cold War 
instrument to a new organization, but which would also minimize the negative 
consequences of enlargement for Russia.”107 
 The United States took some steps to bridge the gap between the positions 
advanced by NATO and Russia. An agreement on four core ideas—non-deployment of 
nuclear and conventional forces, Russia’s seat at NATO’s table, NATO’s open door for 
Russia, and a NATO not aimed at Russia—was reached at a meeting between Strobe 
Talbot and Evgeny Primakov in Moscow in July 1996. However, Russia insisted that 
some unresolved problems required special attention—military issues particularly.108 The 
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importance of these issues was raised during Russia’s contacts with the Foreign Ministers 
of France, Germany and the United Kingdom. These issues were “non-deployment of 
nuclear weapons on the territory of new members,” “non-deployment on a permanent 
basis of foreign troops and related infrastructure,” and defining the core principles of 
modernization of the CFE Treaty.109  
Addressing Russia’s concerns, during Primakov’s visit to New York on 23 
September 1996 the idea of a simultaneous four-direction movement was proposed—
NATO enlargement, NATO’s internal adaptation, NATO-Russia, and the CFE Treaty.110 
Meanwhile, NATO-Russian negotiations were not as successful as they might have been. 
On 10 December 1996, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) stated that the Alliance has 
“no plan, no intention and no reason” to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new 
members.111 Moreover, NATO may have offered “more flexibility on arms control and 
reduction issues and more Western assistance to Russia’s halting economy.”112 Yet, 
during three rounds of talks between NATO and Russia from December 1996 to March 
1997, NATO was not ready to address Russia’s proposal to include military issues in the 
main document. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and Assistant Secretary General 
for Political Affairs Gebhardt von Moltke, while awaiting the results of the Russia-
American summit in Helsinki, were not prepared to accept this proposal.113  
The Helsinki summit addressed some of Russia’s strategic and military concerns. 
According to Yevgeny Primakov, prior to the Helsinki summit, the United States and 
Russia succeeded in “confirming the binding character of the document on NATO-Russia 
relations,” including in the joint statement “an assurance from Clinton that there would be 
no increase close to Russia’s borders of permanently deployed NATO combat forces” 
and “a statement on non-forward movement of nuclear weapons.”114 Consequently, one 
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of the results of the March 1997 Helsinki summit was Russia’s formal agreement on 
NATO enlargement. 
In the course of the subsequent negotiations between NATO and Russia, in 
March-April 1997, positive results were achieved, but two military issues remained 
unresolved—national ceilings of forces in the CFE Treaty and future military 
infrastructure. These problems were resolved in Russian-American meetings in May 
1997 by agreeing “to include in the text provisions on the requirement to respect ‘all 
levels’ established in the original CFE Treaty” and finding a “compromise… on the issue 
of limiting future military infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe.”115 Finally, on 27 
May 1997, the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed in Paris. This event opened the 
door for further NATO enlargement to countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The 
negotiations on the NATO-Russia PJC emphasized the importance of domestic and 
strategic factors in shaping Russia’s foreign policy in 1996-1997.  
An analysis of the NATO enlargement process from 1993 to 1997 shows the 
importance of domestic political and strategic factors in determining the main course of 
interaction between the United States and Russia. The use of international issues for 
domestic purposes influenced Russia’s foreign policy. The analytical framework 
proposed by Stein and Glaser suggests that security motives drove Russian leaders to 
minimize the domestic cost of NATO’s enlargement and consequently to reduce Russia’s 
strategic vulnerability. The strategy of restraint and reciprocity was successful in 
influencing positively Russia’s position on NATO enlargement and in getting Russia to 
participate in the PfP and to establish the NATO-Russia PJC. This approach removed the 
main obstacle in the way of NATO enlargement.  
B.  RUSSIAN MILITARY WITHDRAWAL 
This second case deals with the main actors of Lithuania and Russia. The OSCE 
and the UN were forums in which influence was brought to hear. Lithuanian cooperative 
policies were successful but difficult to implement because of domestic pressures on both 
sides and Lithuania’s lack of experience in dealing with such a strong power as Russia.     
The Lithuanian popular movement “Liberty League” organized signed petitions 
demanding a withdrawal of the occupation army in 1989. When this action was taken 
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over by the national movement for independence “Sajudis,” one million signatures were 
collected from a population of 3.5 million. On 13 March 1990, just after proclamation of 
the nation’s independence, the Lithuanian Parliament—the Seimas—asked Soviet 
President Mikhail Gorbachev to negotiate the withdrawal of the illegally-situated army in 
Lithuania.116 Negotiations between Lithuania and the USSR regarding bilateral relations 
started in August 1990; however, from the beginning the Soviet delegation obviously 
only feigned sincerity about the negotiations.  
The military troop withdrawal was only one of the issues on the agenda of overall 
Lithuanian-Soviet relations. Therefore, at first, the basis for further bilateral relations had 
to be built in order to approach other issues, including the illegal presence of Soviet 
military troops in Lithuania. The process of building bilateral relations only gained a new 
impetus after the meeting between Yeltsin and representatives of the Baltic States in 
Jurmala, Latvia, in the summer of 1990, when an agreement to build relations between 
Russia and the Baltic States through bilateral negotiations was reached.117 It took one 
year to conclude the Lithuanian-Russian state relations bilateral agreement, which was 
ratified by the Russian parliament on 17 January 1992.118 The same day the Lithuanian 
and Russian presidents signed a bilateral communiqué in which for the first time the 
obligation of the former Soviet military troops to withdraw was officially acknowledged, 
and it was noted that negotiations about this withdrawal would be held. This event 
initiated difficult bilateral negotiations lasting for nearly one year and culminating in the 
signing of an agreement on 8 September 1992 about the Russian military withdrawal on 
31 August 1993.119   
In the beginning, the Lithuanian government’s decision on citizenship precluded 
the success of its negotiations on Russia’s military troop withdrawal. According to many 
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observers, including the Russian political elite, the decision to grant Lithuanian 
citizenship to all the country’s permanent residents who wanted it was the most important 
gesture of good neighborliness and gave an additional impulse to bilateral relations in the 
1990s. Lithuania adopted an inclusive policy of naturalizing non-citizens. All permanent 
residents who were born in the republic or had at least one parent or grandparent born 
there were automatically granted citizenship. Those who did not meet these requirements 
but were residing in Lithuania in 1989 could qualify for citizenship by submitting a 
formal request, signing a loyalty declaration, and renouncing any other citizenship. This 
fairly liberal naturalization policy allowed Lithuania to reach an excellent result—95 
percent of all residents of Lithuania are now citizens with full rights to participate in 
political life.120 As noted by Aleksandr Avdeev, “this removed one of the thorniest 
humanitarian and legal issues that still unfortunately lingers in our [Russia’s] relations 
with Latvia and Estonia.”121 The resolution of the problems of national minorities—
ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking minorities in Lithuania, and ethnic Lithuanian and 
Lithuanian-speaking minorities in Russia—on a democratic basis and in accordance with 
European standards became a good basis for reaching agreement on Russian military 
troop withdrawal from Lithuania.  
Despite achieving substantial success in the beginning, the results of the 1992 
negotiations were mixed. The two sides agreed on beginning the military troop 
withdrawal, but this success was undermined by Russia’s unacceptable demands. These 
political and economic demands were driven by Russia’s domestic forces. The first 
meeting between the states’ delegations was held on 31 January 1992 in Vilnius.  The 
Lithuanian delegation was led by Ceslovas Stankiavicius, the Russian delegation by Vice 
Minister Sergei Shakhrai. The Russian side proposed to leave some important military 
units in Lithuania for some time. It was difficult to see any important military 
justification for leaving Russian military units in Lithuania at that time; therefore, 
Russia’s motive could be seen as trying to protract the process of military troop 
withdrawal. The Lithuanian side did not accept this demand and requested that all 
occupation army units be withdrawn by the end of 1992. The signed agreement 
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confirmed only that the Russian army would start its withdrawal in February 1992, it 
stipulated that further negotiations would be held in order to determine the withdrawal 
order and a final date.122 Nevertheless, a first success was reached, and as a result of this 
negotiation, on 27 February 1992, the first Russian military unit left Lithuania; and, on 8 
March 1992, the first garrison in Vilnius was officially transferred to Lithuania.123   
After Lithuania prepared a draft agreement, further rounds of negotiations took 
place in Vilnius on 11-14 February 1992, in Moscow on 18-19 March, and once again in 
Vilnius on 23-24 April. During these negotiations, further agreement was not reached 
because of the conflicting positions on key issues and Russia’s unreasonable demands. 
First, Russia held that it would only have the basis for the complete withdrawal of its 
army after an agreement was signed. The Lithuanian position rested on Lithuania’s 
occupation and forced incorporation by the USSR, which meant that Russia’s 
unconditional international obligation was to withdraw its army of occupation. Second, 
Russia requested that its troops be given legal status for being stationed in Lithuania until 
they were withdrawn. Lithuania insisted that an illegally stationed Russian army could 
not be the subject of law but only a subject for negotiations.124   
Third, Russia wanted to obtain legal recognition for Russia’s ownership rights to 
military installations and receive compensation for them. The Russian delegation also 
tried to pressure Lithuania for funds for new installations for military units returning from 
Lithuania to Russia. Meanwhile Lithuania demanded that Russia compensate it for 
military equipment and property annexed in the 1940s through the provision of weaponry 
and military transport needed to reestablish Lithuania’s defense potential. Fourth, 
Moscow requested citizenship rights for military personnel and housing provision 
guarantees.125 The first two Russian demands were political in nature because the Duma 
did not recognize the illegality of Lithuania’s occupation in the 1940s by the Soviet 
Union. The third demand was financial and could be seen as an attempt to make the troop 
withdrawal less costly at Lithuania’s expense. The last demand was groundless because 
all Russian military personnel who wanted Lithuanian citizenship and privatized 
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apartments succeeded in obtaining these benefits; the only requirement for them was to 
reside in Lithuania for at least 5 years.   
In June 1992, Lithuania initiated more fruitful discussions, but owing to Russian 
political obstacles, the discussions had mixed results. First, the referendum on the former 
Soviet military troops’ unconditional withdrawal and compensation for Soviet damage 
was held in Lithuania on 14 June 1992. It had the strong support of the Lithuanian 
people. Second, on 30 June 1992, Lithuania officially delivered to Russia the schedule for 
the military troop withdrawal from Lithuanian territory by 31 December 1992. This 
schedule was based on the amount of cargo and wagonload requirement estimates, 
adjusted for Lithuanian railroad capabilities. However, Russia found this schedule 
unacceptable, and the negotiations deadlocked. At first glance, it looked like financial 
and technical problems were the main obstacles to withdrawing the troops on time. 
Russian military leaders claimed that “the troops had no place to go,” and that, “the 
troops would leave only after several years.”126 However, Lithuania’s National Defense 
Minister, Audrius Butkiavichius, refuted Russian claims that the withdrawal was 
impossible due to lack of housing for officers and overcrowding of railroad transport. 
7,500 of the 10,500 officers have apartments in Lithuania whose sales 
would provide funds for purchasing new housing elsewhere. Lithuanian 
railroad officials calculated that Russia would require 224 trains with 
10,000 railway cars to withdraw all its troops and equipment. The average 
of 55 trains per month would be slower than the pace of the withdrawal 
from Hungary (80 trains per month) and there would not be any 
overcrowding due to the 30% decrease this year in Lithuanian railroad 
traffic.127  
    
Furthermore, the Baltic States took steps to help Russia build housing for troops 
and their families returning from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.128  
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In reality, there was a political obstacle. The escalation of the conflict in Moldova 
and the aggravation of ethnic tensions in the Baltic States made Russia’s pro-Western 
foreign policy vulnerable to criticism from various “patriotic” forces that had found 
support in the Duma. Anti-Western forces in Russia—ultra-nationalists and the Russian 
military leadership—started to use the issue of the Russian diaspora in their fight for 
power and influence. The Russian military leadership had been trying to support the 
rights of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in the “near abroad:”  
The first draft of the Military Doctrine released in May 1992 identified 
violation of these rights as a serious casus belli. The Ministry of Defence 
used these arguments to establish a linkage between the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from the Baltic States and protection of the rights of 
Russian-speaking minorities there.129  
 
These negative tendencies directly influenced the Russian troop withdrawal from 
Lithuania. According to Vytautas Landsbergis, Lithuanian parliament chairman in 1992, 
some Russian military leaders, following instructions from Moscow, tried to postpone 
handing over installations. He expressed hope that the Russian Defense Ministry would 
abide by the agreements signed on 8 September 1992 and “not yield to delay tactics 
advocated by some conservatives in the Russian parliament.”130 
Second, with the worsening of the internal political situation in Russia in late 
1993, many politicians vigorously started to exploit the issue of the Russian diaspora for 
political purposes. For example, the use of this issue by the ultra-nationalist Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky contributed substantially to his success in the parliamentary elections of 
December 1993. Recognizing its pro-Western foreign policy’s vulnerability to criticism 
from anti-Western forces and seeking to recapture the initiative, the Russian political 
leadership took steps to tighten its policy toward the Baltic States. The Security Council 
developed “The Guidelines of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” which were 
endorsed by President Yeltsin in May 1993. According to this document, “Russian 
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minorities should be considered not only as a priority problem, but also as an important 
asset for Russia’s foreign policy.”131 
On 29 October 1992, Boris Yeltsin halted the withdrawal of troops from all of the 
Baltic Republics to show concern for the Russian minorities there.132 Moreover, the 
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by President Yeltsin’s decree on 2 
November 1993, “indicated the readiness to employ [the] military instrument against the 
forces described as ‘aggressive nationalism and religious intolerance.’”133 These facts 
show how Russian domestic politics influenced the course of negotiations on the Russian 
troop withdrawal.  
The OSCE Helsinki summit, held on 14 July 1992, issued a declaration that 
required an agreement and a schedule for a quick, complete and orderly withdrawal of 
foreign military troops from the Baltic States. The combined effect of the referendum in 
Lithuania and the Helsinki declaration encouraged the pursuit of further negotiations. 
However, Russia turned to the use of pressure tactics on the Baltic States. On 6 
September 1992 Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev met with the Baltic States’ 
foreign ministers, and, as a necessary condition for military troop withdrawal, raised 11 
requirements. To its earlier demands, Russia added one more—the Baltic States must 
renounce their requirements that Russia compensate them for the damage done by the 
USSR from 1940 to 1991. Lithuania declared such demands illegal and therefore 
unacceptable. 134 The negotiations were deadlocked once again, and Russia’s demands 
appeared to be, as before, political and economic in nature.   
However, in the second part of August 1992, as a result of the economic pressure 
from Western countries and the consistency and firmness of the Lithuanian side, Russia 
renounced its unsound conditions and demands and started to yield to Lithuania’s 
position. Negotiations also became easier after Russia’s Ministry of Defense experts, 
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from the officer group “Scit,”135 took over an initiative on bilateral matters from the 
Foreign Ministry. Therefore, both sides were able to reach a compromise and agreed on 
most articles. During the negotiations Russia agreed to compensate Lithuania for military 
equipment and property annexed by the USSR in the 1940s. It also agreed to compensate 
Lithuania for the environmental damage caused by the Russian army after 24 December 
1991. As a result, Lithuania agreed that compensation for the damage caused by the 
USSR from 1940 to 1991 would be negotiated separately. On 8 September 1992, in 
Moscow, seven agreements were prepared and fully coordinated; however, just before the 
signing ceremony Russia decided to sign only three of them.136 Russia turned to old 
requirements and tried to change the agreements to its benefit. This change mainly related 
to financial aspects; it wanted to change the agreement on damage compensation, and let 
its military sell the remaining real estate or leave these installations as common property. 
Later similar demands were imposed on Estonia and Latvia. Russia even asserted that 
without complete agreements there would be no legal basis for a military withdrawal.   
Nevertheless, according to a UN General Assembly special resolution, the 8 
September 1992 agreement was registered in the UN secretariat, and its implementation 
was mandatory.137 These agreements, signed in Moscow by Lithuania’s and Russia’s 
Ministers of Defense, Audrius Butkiavicius and Pavel Grachev, enforced a schedule. In 
conformity with this schedule, Russian ground forces, air defense units, air forces, naval 
forces, and special forces, including the KGB units, had to leave Lithuanian territory. 
These forces comprised 34,600 Russian soldiers or 5 divisions and 295 separate combat 
and supply units.138   
The negotiations were also negatively influenced by domestic factors in 
Lithuania—the lack of experience with such an influential partner as Russia and the 
highly politicized issue of the Russian army withdrawal. First, according to a former 
Lithuanian Prime Minister, Povilas Gylys, the delegation from Vilnius could not agree on 
its top priority—military troop withdrawal or damage compensation. This disagreement, 
which was expressed openly to the Russian delegation, weakened the Lithuanian position 
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in the negotiations. Second, these negotiations took place during vigorous political battles 
in Lithuania. The opposition wanted early elections and a return to power. In this 
situation, there was even a proposal to intern the Russian military. If implemented, this 
step could have worsened relations with Russia, terminating the negotiations about the 
military troop withdrawal and damaging Lithuania’s international image. Anti-
democratic forces in Russia could have used Lithuania’s mistakes to stop the military 
withdrawal process. For example, the $146 million figure as damage compensation was 
mentioned in only one unofficial document; and it was never officially stated as a 
requirement by Lithuania. It was nonetheless presented by Russia’s mass media as 
Lithuania’s main argument. Moreover, provocative Russian commentators raised the 
pressure with false assertions about mistreatment by Lithuanians of the Russian 
military.139 Such an atmosphere negatively influenced the negotiations and made it 
difficult to reach a mutually acceptable compromise. 
Although in October 1992 the Russian army began withdrawing according to the 
signed schedule, this situation changed in 1993. It appeared that Russia wanted to change 
the previously agreed conditions to its benefit by exploiting the polarization in Lithuanian 
society during the presidential election on 4 February 1993. This election was won by 
Algirdas Brazauskas—the former Lithuanian Communist party leader.140 The Russian 
army did not keep to its schedule; there were demands in Russia to stop the withdrawal. 
The pressure to block the military troop withdrawal intensified in Russia. Just 10 days 
before the withdrawal was to be completed, Russia temporarily stopped it, claiming that 
it had to review the agreement. Only through international pressure—diplomatically and 
via Western economic aid to Russia—and Lithuania’s consistent and firm position on 
respecting the agreed conditions did this situation reach a successful end. The final 30 
Russian soldiers joined the last 300 preparing to leave the country on 31 August 1993. 
The whole Russian occupation army then withdrew from Lithuania, earlier than from 
Estonia, Germany, Latvia and Poland.141 
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This case revealed the main factor influencing the negotiations process—domestic 
politics. Russia’s Duma refused to acknowledge the illegality of the Soviet Union’s 
annexation of Lithuania, and this prompted Russia’s completely contrary position on the 
key issues and led to its unreasonable demands. For Lithuania the problems included an 
overly politicized process of negotiations and a lack of experience in dealing with such a 
strong power as Russia. The main motives behind Russia’s position were political and 
economic, and they were driven by domestic forces. Russia tried to use its political 
weight to keep its troops in Lithuania and to lower the cost of troop withdrawal. Without 
international pressure on Russia it would have been a struggle for Lithuania alone to 
protect its position.  
C. KALININGRAD 
The third case is related to the Russian enclave—the Kaliningrad oblast that was 
transferred to Russia after World War II. The main actors are Lithuania, Russia and to 
some extent the EU. Lithuania adopted cooperative policies toward the Kaliningrad 
oblast in order to reduce economic and political pressures in this region and consequently 
to reduce the danger of the Kaliningrad oblast becoming a security threat to the whole 
region, and Lithuania in particular. Despite the negative domestic political forces on both 
sides, Lithuanian cooperative and reassurance policies were mainly successful. Still, 
some problems remained that could be resolved only within the EU-Russia negotiations 
framework.  
The case of the Kaliningrad Oblast becoming a “double periphery”—a Russian 
enclave in the Baltic region and, after Lithuania and Poland joined the EU, a Russian 
enclave in the European Union—could be dangerous not only for Russia and Lithuania 
but also for the whole of Europe. According to Vladimir Nikitin, it could disrupt the 
European Union, owning to the deepening gap in economic development between 
Kaliningrad and neighboring countries; and this could destabilize the Baltic region. This 
could be regarded by the European Union and consequently Lithuania as a security 
threat.142 Therefore, it is important to consider what policies Lithuania is pursuing toward 
Kaliningrad. So far these policies have been successful. One of the major factors that 
provided the background for success in the Lithuanian-Russian relations was the way in 
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which Lithuania approached the problem of Kaliningrad. Lithuania was one of the first 
states, which adequately understood this problem and, according to former Vice-Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of Lithuania Vygaudas Usackas, “pursued the most rational 
cooperative policies based on openness, transparency and mutual trust.” He has added 
that the Kaliningrad Oblast is Lithuania’s number one partner in Russia and Lithuania’s 
relations with the Kaliningrad Oblast will affect regional stability.143 Therefore, 
Lithuania has engaged the Russian enclave in mutually beneficial contacts. Until May 
2004, when Lithuania became a member of the European Union, a visa-free regime 
functioned between Lithuania and Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad trade crosses the territory of 
Lithuania, and Lithuania supplies Kaliningrad with electrical energy. Lithuania’s share of 
investment in the oblast is substantial. A joint association of businessmen has been 
established. Cooperation in other spheres is also expanding: in the humanities, medicine 
and environmental protection.144  
Two agreements between Lithuania and Russia deserve particular attention: (1) 
the agreement on the crossing points on the Lithuanian-Russian border and the 
procedures of military transit to and from Kaliningrad through the territory of Lithuania, 
and (2) the border treaty signed in 1997. In January 1995, Lithuania and Russia resolved 
one of a number of highly sensitive and problematic issues—military transit—and agreed 
on the procedure for military transit to and from Kaliningrad through the territory of 
Lithuania. In the course of the negotiations with Russia on military transit, Lithuania 
made a thorough analysis of the pertinent experience of other states and applied it to the 
regulation of military cargo transport in Lithuania. On 3 October 1994, the Lithuanian 
government passed the act on “Rules for the Transportation of Foreign States’ Dangerous 
Military Cargoes through Lithuanian Republic Territory.” According to this act, Russian 
military cargoes within Lithuanian territory are to be guarded by a Lithuanian military 
escort. Russian military escort weapons are to be secured in special boxes until their 
arrival at the border with Russia. Russian military escort personnel are not allowed to 
leave their van during stops. An additional annex to this act, which improved the rules for 
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the transportation of dangerous military cargoes, was in June 2000 endorsed by the 
Lithuanian government as Act No. 691.145 The annually renewed regulations on the 
military cargo transport from Russia are likewise applied to the military transit of other 
foreign countries. There have been no conflicts between Lithuania and Russia on the 
military transit issue to date. However, this issue remains sensitive for Lithuanians. For 
example, during discussions about military transit in 1994, the media criticized “Russia’s 
intentions to travel freely through Lithuanian ground and air space to the militarized 
Kaliningrad oblast.”146 Moreover, concerns regarding the possibility of transporting 
nuclear weapons by railroad through Lithuanian territory and the overall security level of 
Russian military transit were raised in January 2001.147  
Another noteworthy agreement is the border treaty, signed by Lithuania and 
Russia on 24 October 1997, ratified by Lithuania’s Seimas in 1999, and finally ratified by 
Russia’s Duma on 21 May 2003. In essence, the treaty reinforces an earlier 
administrative border between the two countries, which was demarcated in 1963. 
According to the treaty, any adjustments in the border must be insignificant and are liable 
to adequate compensation. According to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir 
Chizhov,  
Under the treaty small areas of territory of each side were exchanged to 
compensate each other for a total of 413.8 hectares. The exchange was 
conducted on the principle of strict and adequate compensation; therefore, 
the territory of Russia and Lithuania did not increase or decrease by one 
square meter.148 
 
 Lithuania is the only Baltic state that has such an agreement with Russia. This 
confirms the success of Lithuanian policy in dealing with Russia. Lithuania’s policy of 
engagement with Kaliningrad in mutually beneficial contacts became a good basis for 
resolving military transit and border issues. Lithuania helped Moscow reach one of 
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Russia’s objectives—establishing strong ties with its western region, Kaliningrad—by 
creating a more comprehensive legal basis. Lithuanian business, NGO and government 
representatives have been actively collaborating with their colleagues in Kaliningrad in 
their effort to advance mutually beneficial relations. For example, in 2001, 348 
Lithuanian enterprises were functioning in Kaliningrad.149 In addition to the border treaty 
and the agreement on military transit a considerable number of inter-governmental 
agreements concerning relations between Lithuania and Kaliningrad have been signed: an 
Agreement in 1992 on Trade and Economic Relations, which provided for most-favored-
nation treatment; the inter-institutional agreement in 1992-1993 on transport; an inter-
governmental agreement in 1994 on interstate travel of the citizens of both states; and the 
inter-governmental Agreement for Long-Term Cooperation between Kaliningrad Oblast 
and Lithuania in 1999.  
On 9 February 2000, the Lithuanian Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vygaudas 
Usackas, and the Russian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ivan Ivanov, met in Nida 
to sign the “Nida Initiative,” which proposed to the EU coordinated initiatives in trade, 
health care, combating crime, strengthening border control and cross-border cooperation. 
This initiative was approved in June 2000 by the heads of state and government of the EU 
members in Santa Maria da Feira, Portugal. During 2000 alone this initiative helped 
launch several important projects with international support in Kaliningrad: the 
Eurofaculty, which will teach students in accordance with the EU curriculum; a project 
on “Reconstruction of Water Supply Systems of Kaliningrad and Environmental 
Protection;” and the European Union’s Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (TACIS) Cross-Border Cooperation program for Kaliningrad.150 
Despite all the progress achieved in improving relations with Russia, some 
negative points should be mentioned here. Domestic forces in Russia and Lithuania 
undermined the resolution of military transit and border issues. On the Russian side, the 
ratification of the border treaty was postponed by the Duma for nearly six years for 
various reasons, including at times its utility as a pretext to manipulate Lithuania on other 
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issues. For example, the issue of Russian citizens’ transit was used to postpone the 
ratification of the border treaty. Russia’s presidential representative for the Kaliningrad 
region, Dmitri Rogozin, by raising the “problem of Russian citizens’ transit through 
Lithuanian territory,” sought to block the Duma hearings on the border treaty.151 On the 
Lithuanian side, concerning the problems that impede positive bilateral relations, the 
issue of the legitimacy of Kaliningrad’s belonging to Russia should be mentioned. 
According to Genady Kretinin, Lithuanian politicians often issue statements concerning a 
possible revision of the Potsdam treaty of 1945. The exaggeration of this historical 
problem could in some circumstances result in separatist tendencies in some parts of the 
region. Therefore, there is a need to localize the separatist movements that appear in 
Lithuanian politics.152 
At this point it is reasonable to conclude that Lithuanian cooperative policies in 
engaging Moscow about issues associated with the Russian enclave, the Kaliningrad 
oblast, were successful. Lithuania was able to solve a difficult transit question and was 
the first of the Baltic States to sign a border treaty with Russia. Despite some 
impediments stemming from domestic politics in Russia and Lithuania, these policies 
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Lithuania’s security presently rests on several pillars, including membership in 
NATO and the EU and its relations with Russia. Lithuania’s membership in NATO and 
the EU is the basis for its stability and security. However, positive cooperation between 
Lithuania and Russia is also important. Such cooperation helps reduce economic and 
political pressures in the Baltic region and consequently reduces the danger of the 
Kaliningrad oblast becoming a security threat to Lithuania. Moreover, Lithuania’s 
security could be strengthened by integrating Russia into the international economic and 
security community. However, Russia will only be accepted as a reliable partner in 
international security after it has improved its relations with the countries that it 
historically dominated or even annexed on the new basis of mutual respect for the 
sovereignty and integrity of all states and a common sense of security in the region. 
Therefore good relations between Lithuania and Russia are mutually important and 
desirable.  
In general terms, owing largely to the cooperative policies pursued by Vilnius, 
Lithuanian-Russian relations are good. Lithuania’s independence was recognized two 
weeks after the Moscow putsch of August 1991, and this independence has never been 
questioned. Russian military forces were withdrawn from the country in 1993, a year 
before they left Estonia, Germany and Latvia. According to the Russian political elite, 
relations are not as close as they could be because of Lithuania’s alignment with the 
West, but they are positive. Russia does not find many reasons to criticize Vilnius 
publicly, as it does with respect to Tallinn and especially Riga. Day-to-day relations 
between the ethnic Russian minority and the majority of Lithuanian citizens are conflict-
free. There is no discrimination.153  
Lithuania contributed to reducing some of Russia’s strategic concerns by 
presenting a confidence building initiative in accordance with the Statement on the 
Development of the Relations with Russia and Security and Confidence Building 
Measures of 28 March 1998. Vilnius extended an invitation to Russia to observe military 
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exercises in Lithuania, exchanging observation visits exceeding quotas set in the 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty in military confidence and security 
building measures. Vilnius also invited Russian military and civilian representatives to 
attend environmental training courses in Lithuania.154 These initiatives may help to 
reduce Russian uncertainties and avoid possible miscalculations.  The increased state-to-
state interaction through inspections and data exchanges may help to build confidence on 
both sides. It would also be beneficial for Lithuania to adhere to the CFE treaty. By doing 
so, Lithuania would reduce the concerns expressed by some Russians about a 
hypothetical increase of NATO conventional forces in the Baltic region.  
However, there may not be much more that can be done to improve relations 
between Lithuania and Russia. Lithuania has little to offer Russia economically or 
strategically. They are unequal powers, and it would be unrealistic to expect significant 
positive effects on security in the region and for Lithuania from further initiatives by 
Vilnius. To improve seriously the situation in Europe as a whole, NATO and Russia must 
narrow their differences and rebuild their relationship. However, the role of Lithuania as 
a member of the EU and NATO and as Russia’s closest neighbor in improving security in 
the region can hardly be underestimated.  
At this point, addressing the previously raised hypotheses and questions is in 
order. First, it appears that  
• Russia is potentially insecure and driven mainly by security needs. 
However, some signs of opportunism are also present, as a result of strategic 
vulnerability and economic weakness. 
• Democratic political forces in Russia may prevail, but the negative influence 
of anti-democratic forces is still present and may be growing stronger. 
Second, considering the uncertainty of further political and economic 
developments in Russia and the possibility of a direct military threat, Lithuania’s 
membership in NATO may function as a credible deterrent and therefore should be 
maintained in good order. However, deterrence could fail as a result of Russian domestic 
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factors (for example, misperceptions, cognitive failures, shifts in domestic political 
forces, and/or opportunistic motives).  
Third, to compensate for the limitations of deterrence strategies, reassurance and 
cooperative policies could be useful. These policies may in some circumstances help 
decrease tensions between states, mitigate some concerns, and build confidence. These 
policies have better prospects for success in the following circumstances:  
• Antidemocratic domestic forces in the potential adversary state have less 
influence than the democratic forces or are entirely neutralized;  
• The state-to-state negotiation process is not highly politicized by domestic 
forces advocating coercive policies; and 
• The bargaining power of the states is not substantially unequal and, 
therefore, a broader agenda of negotiations can be pursued in a more 
balanced manner. 
 Lithuania’s ability to design and pursue reassurance and cooperative policies 
autonomously has become limited since it joined the EU and NATO in 2004. Some 
issues involve collective EU and/or NATO policies, and Lithuania must work with its 
fellow EU and/or NATO members to address them. However, the EU membership (or the 
NATO membership) acting collectively may make reassurance and cooperative policies 
more successful, and this result may positively affect Lithuania’s security. Membership 
in the EU and NATO will reduce the difference with Russia in bargaining power, and this 
may make negotiations less politicized.       
Fourth, Lithuanian reassurance and cooperative policies have been successful in 
the years since 1991, but these policies have two weaknesses—difficulty in 
implementation and the possibility of failure. The implementation of reassurance and 
cooperative policies may be difficult because of disturbing domestic forces, unequal 
interests in successfully concluding negotiations, and different power resources on each 
side. Although these policies are promising, they may fail. To begin with, little can be 
achieved in bilateral relations to improve regional security because Lithuania and Russia 
are at radically different economic, military and political power levels. Furthermore, 
reassurance and cooperative policies could fail as a result of the huge difference in 
bargaining power or if Russia’s priorities became driven by extraneous factors. While 
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Russia has some legitimate concerns, including security, some Russian political factions 
would apparently like to go beyond the satisfaction of these legitimate concerns and seek 
to regain Moscow’s former great-power status and dominate the Baltic States in political, 
economic, and military spheres. Russia’s concerns are driven by both objective needs and 
the subjective opportunism of specific political forces. Moreover, it is difficult to measure 
the impact and to predict the result of reassurance and cooperative policies, owing to 
external factors, such as economic relations with the Western countries, changes in the 
international oil market and security environment, and decisions made by international 
organizations. Indeed, some observers might argue that the success of Lithuania’s 
cooperative policies toward Russia could in some circumstances depend on Russia’s 
economic and strategic weakness. Considering this, it could be dangerous for Lithuania, 
especially on its own, to build its relations with Russia only on the basis of reassurance 
and cooperative policies. Therefore, NATO membership should be the main guarantor of 
Lithuania’s security, reinforced by the political solidarity of the European Union.   
Four recommendations regarding Lithuania’s policies toward Russia as a member 
of the EU and NATO could be appropriate. First, Lithuania should pursue reassurance 
and cooperative policies to compensate for the limitations of deterrence strategies, to 
mitigate any legitimate Russian concerns, and to build the basis for future mutually 
beneficial relations in accordance with EU and NATO policies and existing instruments. 
Second, to mitigate the potentially negative impact of the 2002-2004 round of NATO 
enlargement on Russian-Lithuanian relations, it could be useful to increase mutual 
transparency through dialogues on security among private citizens, defense officials and 
military officers from the nations concerned. Third, Lithuania should coordinate its 
policies with other countries in the Baltic region, and support initiatives conceived with 
Russia in mind, like the Northern dimension initiative,155 in order to strengthen stability 
and security in this region. Fourth, Lithuania should engage Russian democratic forces in 
dialogues and in bilateral and multilateral activities in order to strengthen their position 
and consequently make cooperative policies more successful.  
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Because Lithuania’s security depends on many factors, carefully chosen and 
balanced policies are more appropriate than reliance exclusively on deterrence strategies 
or policies of reassurance and cooperation. The latter policies in particular will be 
pursued in the future by NATO and the EU as a whole and by Lithuania as a member of 
these organizations.        
It would be useful to conduct further research on Russia’s politics and especially 
on the main factors influencing its decision-making, because these factors will strongly 
affect the outcome of reassurance and cooperative policies as well as deterrence 
strategies. Russia is still in transition; therefore it would be premature to draw 
overarching conclusions about the nature of developments in Russia and to offer precise 
prescriptions for Lithuania to pursue. In order to define the appropriate policies toward 
Russia, a thorough analysis of potential developments in Russian politics over the 
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